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Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America’s 
homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our 
inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to 
prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison 
deradicalization program. 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/ 
disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis 
identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United 
States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison 
deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison 
radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. 
Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are 
made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that 
make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization.   
. 
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Scattered across the American landscape, shrouded by razor wire and security 
watch towers, resembling air traffic control stations, are America’s correctional facilities. 
Within each correctional facility lives a restrictive, multifaceted community of 
individuals who collectively make up the inmate population of the United States. This 
unique population, prone to violence and antisocial behavior, has been identified as being 
vulnerable to a lethal phenomenon known as prison radicalization.1  For the purpose of 
this research, prison radicalization is defined as a cognitive process whereby inmates 
develop a violent, extremist mindset that legitimatizes the need and use of violence to 
promote a political or religious agenda. Prison radicalization has left its footprint on 
society through the actions of individuals such as Kevin James, Jose Padilla, and Michael 
Finton.2  Inmates, who were radicalized inside correctional facilities and set forth on a 
mission, within our neighborhoods, to kill and destroy to promote their ideology.   
Kevin James was 21 years old and a Crip gang member when he entered 
California State Prison for robbery.3 James founded the extremist group Jam’iyyat Ul-
Islam Is-Saheeh (Assembly of Authentic Islam or JIS) while incarcerated in California’s 
New Folsom State Prison. James used his gang influence and charismatic personality to 
radicalize and recruit fellow gang members as well as encourage other members to recruit 
once released on parole.4  Outside of prison, members planned terrorist attacks on Los 
Angeles area synagogues, military facilities, and the Israeli consulate.   
Jose Padilla is currently serving a 17-year sentence for conspiracy to commit 
murder.5  Padilla converted to Islam in prison and associated himself with members of al-
                                                 
1 Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation 
Understanding the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008); 
Frank J. Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization: A Special Report 
(Washington, DC: George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006). 
2 House Committee on Homeland Security, Background Information on Prominent Post-9/11 U.S. 
Prison Radicalization Cases (Washington, DC: Committee on Oversight and Government Affairs, 2011). 
3 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 70. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Committee on Homeland Security, Background Information, 3. 
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Qaeda before becoming a member himself. He plotted multiple “dirty bomb” attacks on 
U. S. targets prior to being arrested on May 8, 2002.6  Michael Finton was radicalized in 
an Illinois prison and later conspired with an undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) agent to murder Representative Aaron Schock by setting off a bomb outside the 
congressman’s office.7  Although not every radicalized prisoner commits an act of 
terrorism, it is critical that we realize every radicalized prisoner poses a significant 
security threat that deserves proactive attention.   
Although the number of individuals under corrections supervision declined 1.3 
percent in 2010, the United States continues to maintain the largest prison population in 
the world at just over 1.6 million inmates.8  Ninety-five percent of the inmate population 
in the United States will be returning to our communities.9  One of the most critical 
responsibilities all correctional systems share is providing inmates rehabilitation 
opportunities that enhance their chances of becoming law abiding citizens upon their 
return to society. Currently, the United States has no deradicalization/disengagement 
model to combat prison radicalization.     
The American prison system exemplifies many of the variables that have been 
identified as promoting radicalization. Prisons are described as isolated environments, 
full of socially isolated souls desperately searching for a sense of self identification.10  In 
such an environment, inmates become easy targets for radical extremists searching for 
individuals to join their cause. It is important to note that the majority of American 
inmates are incarcerated in state prisons and local jails.11  Considering the high volume of 
inmates incarcerated locally, the United States must focus on the potential for  
 
                                                 
6 Committee on Homeland Security, Background Information, 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “U.S. Correctional Population Declined for Second Consecutive Year,” 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/p10cpus10pr.cfm (accessed May 3, 
2012). 
9 Timothy Hughes and Doris J. Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United States (Washington, DC: Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, 2004). 
10 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 
11 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “U.S. Correctional Population Declined,” 1.  
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radicalization within state and local correctional facilities and not just in federal prisons. 
We must recognize prison radicalization as a significant concern and threat to America’s 
homeland security.  
Prison radicalization is not exclusive to Islamic radicalization; although Islamic 
radicalization, based on prior incidents of prisoners being radicalized in prison and 
engaging in terrorist activity, seems to be most prevalent. Frank Cilluffo’s testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs identified 
the ever-present threat of right-wing radicals and terrorists.   Although not sharing the 
same in-group with the Islamic Jihadist, these groups will join efforts in promoting their 
hatred of the United States government and Israel.12  In recognizing the importance of 
countering all forms of radicalization (Islamic, right wing, etc.), it is also important to 
recognize that prison radicalization and prison security threat group (STG) activity are 
entirely different components of destructive activity. Although prison gangs are one of 
the most destructive forces inside our correctional facilities today and, in some cases, 
STG activity has been used as a tool to help recruit and promote prison radicalization, 
most security threat groups (STG) are criminally oriented and their violent actions are not 
driven by a political or religious ideology.13 
Currently, opportunities for prison radicalization permeates the perimeters of our 
correctional facilities unchecked and traveling in both directions. The radicalized 
message enters the correctional environment through numerous avenues.  Radicalized 
inmates, unvetted radical chaplains, extremist propaganda labeled as religious material, 
illegal cell phones, and social media sites deliver the messages of intolerance and 
destruction that justify violence to support a particular political agenda or religious 
ideology. Just as the radicalized message enters our correctional facilities and finds fertile 
ground to multiply, the deadliest consequences are recognized when the radicalized 
inmate leaves the facility and enters society to carry out their final actions in a deadly act 
called terrorism.  
                                                 
12 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are 
Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong. 2nd sess., 2006, 6. 
13 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends, 
2011, http://info.publicintelligence.net/NGIC-GTA-2011.pdf (accessed September 17, 2012).  
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Without an established deradicalization/disengagement model that offers inmates 
education, vocational, and treatment options to counter prison radicalization, the United 
States will maintain a reactive posture to inmates returning to society who may have been 
exposed to radicalization during their period of incarceration, not to mention the terrorist 
who completes his/her sentence and returns to society. Correctional policymakers must 
be cognizant of the contributing factors that promote radicalization within the prison and 
ensure procedures are designed to counter prison radicalization. The cost of this proactive 
approach pales in comparison to the consequences of maintaining the status quo. Failing 
to provide aggressive treatment and program options to counteract prison radicalization 
leaves the prison gates open to releasing potentially radicalized individuals back into our 
neighborhoods.   
What would an effective American deradicalization/disengagement program for 
American correctional facilities consist of?  To address this question, this thesis will 
answer the following research questions: 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
1. What are the most effective strategies to counter prison radicalization in 
the United States? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
1. What are the contributing factors that promote prison radicalization? 
2. What effect do prison gangs or security threat groups (STGs) have on 
prison radicalization? 
3. What elements of the Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s prison 
deradicalization rehabilitation program could be applied to an American 
prison deradicalization program? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will utilize a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/ 
disengagement programs; one currently being utilized in the Singapore prison system and 
one being the Saudi Arabia prison system. Through research, these two programs will be 
studied and analyzed to collect externally valid data that will be utilized to frame a 
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suggested best practice deradicalization/disengagement model for consideration by 
United States correctional policymakers. By utilizing a comparative analysis approach, 
the core program principles and policies can be investigated and analyzed to determine 
the most successful elements that may be adaptable to the United States.  
Given the fact there are currently no prison deradicalization programs in the 
United States, two programs from other countries were selected for the comparative 
analysis. Singapore was chosen primarily due to the reported success of its program, and 
the fact that Singapore, like the United States, has a minority Muslim population. 
Although the research will not focus exclusively on Islamic radicalization, the Singapore 
program will offer a unique picture of rehabilitation and aftercare of a minority Muslim 
population and, in turn, provide data that will be beneficial in developing a recommended 
United States deradicalization model. Saudi Arabia was chosen primarily due to the 
reported success of the program. 
The development of a United States prison deradicalization/disengagement model 
will require the identification of contributing factors, within the prison setting, that 
promote prison radicalization and suggested methods of countering and reducing the 
effects of prison radicalization. Existing research relevant to prison radicalization and the 
comparative analysis of Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s prison deradicalization programs 
will provide data relevant to reducing the vulnerability of prisoner radicalization inside 
the correctional domain as well as provide possible treatment and rehabilitative options 
for radicalized prisoners.   
Recognizing the limitations in comparing two countries with very different 
government structures and constitutional safeguards, not to mention the complexity of 
ideological motivated radicalization, an objective comparison of two existing 
deradicalization programs will provide useful data for consideration in recommending a 
best practice U.S. deradicalization model. Although all characteristics of the Singapore 
and Saudi programs will be compared, I will concentrate on the following elements of 
each program as determining factors that suggest program success and 
deradicalization/disengagement efforts: 
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1. Program rehabilitative efforts (cognitive or educational) used to counter 
violent ideological beliefs/rationalizations that support the use of violence 
to promote a political or religious agenda. 
2. Program characteristics: voluntary or involuntary participation and 
incentives for participation and successful completion. 
3. Reported success of the program 
4. Methods used to promote legitimacy and validity to the program which in 
theory increases the program’s success. 
5. Methods of aftercare or post release supervision. 
C. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The prison deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi Arabia were 
designed and implemented based on the governmental oversight for each particular 
country, applicable laws, and cultural considerations of both countries represented. 
Acknowledging the absence of a democratic governmental structure that supports full 
disclosure, the data presented in this thesis was derived from open source material as 
reported by the source and the two governments of Singapore and Saudi Arabia. I 
recognize and acknowledge the profound differences in both governmental structures as 
well as the significant variations related to the absence of civil liberties protections and 
due process protections as compared to the United States.  
Even so, the value of researching and studying best practices from what appears 
to be successful deradicalization programs from other countries should not be dismissed. 
Albeit the deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi Arabia were designed to 
counter radicalization within their respective borders, unique elements of these programs 
may offer possible solutions to prison radicalization in the United States that should be 
studied and evaluated through a filter that maintains the constitutional protections 
afforded to U.S. prisoners.    
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature related to prison radicalization and de-radicalization programs 
originates primarily from governmental reports, testimony during congressional hearings, 
university research reports, and studies conducted by law enforcement agencies. This 
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literature review focuses on prison radicalization, which is divided into two sub 
categories—literature that identifies contributing factors that promote prison 
radicalization and literature that identifies strategies to counter prison radicalization. The 
literature review briefly focuses on prison de-radicalization policies in Middle Eastern 
countries. The majority of the literature related to prison radicalization, as well as prison 
de-radicalization policies, targets radical Islamic extremism, and ignores other extremist 
groups. 
1. Prison Radicalization: Contributing Factors   
In a 2008 RAND Europe governmental report, the contributing factors of prison 
radicalization of young European Muslims was researched. The report identifies 
perceived racism or discrimination as a potential catalyst to radicalization.14  The report 
studies the impact of incarceration on young Muslims based on “generalized principles” 
that the author uses to define the common prison experience. The report compares 
prisoner behavior traits for violent Jihadist with other extremist groups, such as Irish 
Republicans. Similar group traits are identified;15 yet more importantly, critical 
differences are recognized that may provide significant insights to identifying counter-
radicalization approaches. The report recognizes the prison experience as enhancing the 
possibility for radicalization, yet it fails to address the different types or levels of 
incarceration, such as maximum custody supervision versus minimum custody 
supervision. Without distinguishing between the different levels of prison supervision 
and the possible effects each could have on radicalization, a complete picture of the 
incarceration experience is not possible.    
A special report by the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, titled Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, provided 
findings from a task force of subject matter experts who studied all facets of prison 
radicalization.16  The task force studied prison radicalization and solicited valuable 
                                                 
14 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 14. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, i. 
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insight from correctional professionals at the federal, state, and local levels to analyze the 
complex phenomenon known as prison radicalization. The report provided several key 
findings and identified a common gap in the literature by reinforcing the point that social 
science research related to American prison radicalization is definitely insufficient to 
provide a clear understanding of the concept.17 
Governments have shown an interest in identifying the contributing factors that 
promote radicalization. A Dutch government study in 2005 identified a factor of the 
radicalization process as being a crisis of self-identity.18  The Dutch study identifies an 
internal struggle that young Muslims experience by being incarcerated in a foreign 
country and how feelings of discrimination and racism may contribute to the 
radicalization process.19  A 2007 U.K. government study supported the Dutch research by 
identifying the self-identity conflict as being a significant factor in prison radicalization. 
During a 2006 Senate hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Frank Cilluffo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute 
at George Washington University, testified that poor screening procedures and 
inadequate supervision of clergy and religious volunteers enhance the threat of religious 
radicalization among prisoners.20  Cilluffo’s testimony identified a common theme in the 
literature that most American correctional facilities are understaffed and employees are 
ill-trained to recognize and respond to prison radicalization. Furthermore, a 2004 survey 
of 193 state wardens provided evidence that half of the wardens permitted inmates to act 
as spiritual leaders and conduct religious services due to a shortage of correctional 
religious staff.21  In addition, the testimony provided during the 2006 hearing emphasized  
 
 
                                                 
17 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, i. 
18 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 14. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization, 159. 
21 George W. Knox, The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups in American Prisons Today: 
Recent Research Findings from the 2004 Prison Gang Survey (Peotone, IL: National Gang Crime Research 
Center, 2005). http://www.ngcrc.com/corr2006.html (accessed August 15, 2012). 
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a common goal shared by other extremist groups such as Christian Identity and Aryan 
Nation groups with extremist Muslim groups in promoting hostility toward the United 
States government and Israel.22   
On June 15, 2011, Peter King, Committee Chairman for the United States House 
of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, held hearings on the threat of 
Muslim-American radicalization in United States prisons. The testimony of Michael 
Downing, Commanding Officer of the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau 
of the Los Angeles Police Department, identified the prison’s isolated environment a 
place where violence is the norm and the cultural discontent within make prisons 
susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by extremist groups.23  The literature 
recognizes 80 percent of prison converts as individuals converting to Islam and correlates 
this conversion with dozens of Americans, who after converting to Islam, traveled to 
Yemen to receive training from al-Qaeda.24   
Research has labeled prisons as radicalization incubators. A New York Police 
Department (NYPD) report entitled, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 
listed prisons along with cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, student associations, 
hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops, and book stores as “pit stops” or “meeting 
places” that serve as radicalizing agents.25 The report identified prisons as “a radicalizing 
cauldron,” playing a critical role in both triggering and reinforcing the radicalization 
process. The prison’s “isolated environment, ability to create a captive audience 
atmosphere, its absence of day to day distractions, and its large population of disaffected 
young men, has been identified as making it an excellent breeding ground for  
 
                                                 
22 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization, 159. 
23 House Committee on Homeland Security, The Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S. 
Prisons, 112th Cong. 1st sess. [Testimony of Michael Downing], 2, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=9102 
(accessed September 12, 2012). 
24 Ibid., 3. 
25 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: 
New York City Police Department, 2007). 
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radicalization.”26 This NYPD report and the testimony provided by Michael Downing 
promotes a common theme regarding correctional characteristics that make prisons 
susceptible to radicalization and extremism. 
2. Prison Radicalization: Counter-Radicalization Strategies 
A common theme in the literature related to counter-radicalization strategies is the 
importance of controlling gang activity and its influence on extremist groups. In 2011, 
the National Gang Intelligence Center reported that when compared to other inmates, 
prison gang members were more susceptible to radicalization.27  The report stated gang 
members’ resentment toward authority and feelings of rejection from mainstream society 
were the catalysts that promoted the propensity for radicalization.28  In October 2008, 
Mark Hamm authored an article for the National Institute of Justice, “Prisoner 
Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions,” that emphasized 
the influence a charismatic gang leader, such as Kevin James, could have on 
individuals.29  The literature calls attention to the importance of monitoring such activity 
and extending counter-radicalization efforts once the inmates leave the correctional 
facility.   
Michael Downing’s testimony in June 2011 provided details of counter 
radicalization strategies between law enforcement and correctional agencies. Downing 
explained how the Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) program serves as a specialized 
point of contact for the community, providing terrorism information and intelligence.30 
Downing explained how the TLO program had been extended into the California prison 
system.31  The report gives a rare example of law enforcement and correctional systems 
                                                 
26 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 39. 
27 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-
assessment (accessed October 20, 2011).  
28 Ibid. 
29 Mark S. Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalizaton: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Facilities,” NIJ 
Journal 261 (October, 2008). 
30 House Committee on Homeland Security. The Threat of Muslim-American, 2.  
31 Ibid. 
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joining forces to share information related to prison radicalization and terrorism. What 
the testimony fails to provide is a recommendation or strategy to combat the factors that 
promote prison radicalization, which has been identified as a significant gap in the 
literature. 
Michael Brown’s thesis, “Freed: Ripples of the Convicted and Released Terrorist 
in America,” identified the fact that America’s prison system does not treat terrorist any 
differently than other convicted criminals.32  The thesis does a good job demonstrating 
the, “out of sight, out of mind” mentality that America seems to promote once we 
incarcerate a terrorist. This literature is relevant because it identifies a significant gap in 
the literature related to the absence of prison rehabilitation programs that target prison 
radicalization. Most of the literature mentioned in this review identifies the problem 
(prison radicalization) yet fails to recommend a policy that provides the inmate with an 
avenue to disengage from the radicalized mindset before returning to society.   
3. De-radicalization Policies: Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and United 
States 
Literature related to prison deradicalization/disengagement programs 
predominately focus on Saudi Arabia and Singapore’s efforts to rehabilitate the 
radicalized mindset. In a February 2008 article for Perspectives on Terrorism, John 
Horgan, a leading figure in the study of deradicalization and disengagement efforts, 
provides a detailed analysis of the difference in the two terms, deradicalization and 
disengagement.33  Horgan stresses the importance in understanding the phases of 
radicalization and how understanding the disengagement of an individual from terroristic 
activity may provide valuable details to promote counterterrorism strategy.34 Horgan 
points to the reality that not every individual who experiences disengagement from 
terrorist activity experiences deradicalization.35 
                                                 
32 Michael A. Brown, “Freed: Ripples of the Convicted and Released Terrorist in America” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 129.  
33John Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?” Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 4 (2010). 
34 Ibid., 4. 
35 Ibid.  
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In an April, 2011 article from the Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter 
Terrorism, titled “Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative,” Rohan Gunaratna, 
makes the case for rehabilitating the “operational terrorist” and the “extremist supporters” 
prior to these individuals returning to society.36  Gunaratna provides a comprehensive 
summary of the different opportunities or areas for terrorist rehabilitation and provides 
the rationale and operational components of Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group 
(RRG).37  In addition, Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, a research analyst for the 
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of 
Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyyang Technological University, Singapore, authored 
a 2006 article in Small Wars & Insurgencies, titled, “An Ideological Response to 
Combating Terrorism: The Singapore Perspective.”  Hassan makes the case for utilizing 
an “ideological response” to combat terrorism.38  The paper uses the Singapore 
experience in fighting the radicalized mindset as an example of how to take a soft 
approach to prisoner radicalization and provides examples of utilizing the religious 
community as partners in the battle against the radicalized individual.39  
The late Christopher Boucek, who served as an associate in the Carnegie Middle 
East Program, provided a great deal of the literature related to Saudi Arabia’s 
counterterrorism efforts. In 2008, Boucek wrote a paper that was published by the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, titled, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” 
Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare.40  Boucek 
provided a general overview of the early history of the program that was initiated after a 
series of lethal terrorist attacks that plagued Saudi Arabia in 2003. Boucek provides an 
overview of the various stages of the “soft” approach to fighting radicalization and 
                                                 
36 Rohan Gunaratna, “Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence 
and Counter Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2011): 65. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Mohamed Feisal Mohamed Hassan and Kenneth G. Pereire, “An Ideological Response to 
Combating Terrorism: The Singapore Perspective,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 17, no. 4 (December, 
2006): 458–477. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Christopher Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy Prevention, Rehabilitation, 
and Aftercare (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008). 
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explains how the “war of the minds” can be fought by taking a re-education approach that 
teaches detainees and inmates, who have received a flawed ideological perspective of the 
Islamic faith, a true understanding of their religious doctrine.41  The three main focus 
areas of the Saudi plan, prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare, are examined to provide 
the reader a general idea of the specific goals for each phase of the program.42 
Realizing the importance of an accurate assessment of the effectiveness of such 
programs, John Horgan and Kurt Braddock authored a March 2010 article, 
“Rehabilitating the Terrorists: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-
radicalization Programs,” published in Terrorism and Political Violence.43  The article 
reviewed Boucek’s summary of the Saudi program and provided a critical analysis of 
how the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs were measured.44  The article 
pointed to serious considerations when attempting to determine the success of any 
deradicalization program.45   
Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan’s Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and 
Collective Disengagement, uses case studies to provide an analysis of disengagement and 
de-radicalization initiatives in non-Western countries.46  In 2010, the International Centre 
for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence published a study of de-
radicalization programs in Middle Eastern countries.47  Although this literature is 
relevant to prison de-radicalization policy and provides details of Middle Eastern de-
                                                 
41 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy. 
42 Ibid. 
43John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the 
Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs, “ Terrorism & Political Violence 22, no. 2 (April, 2010): 
267–291. 
44 Ibid., 276–277. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective 
Disengagement (New York: Routledge, 2009), 308. 
47 Peter R. Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15 Countries 
(London, England: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010), 
http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15
Countries.pdf (accessed June 15, 2012). 
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radicalization models, there is no literature related to U.S. prison de-radicalization models 
thus identifying a significant void in the research. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The literature related to prison radicalization and counter radicalization strategies 
recognizes the need for additional research.48  Some literature has identified social factors 
related to prison radicalization yet failed to identify strategies that might negate the 
environmental factors, found in prison, that contribute to radicalization. Very little 
attention has been given to distinguishing between possible effects of different security 
custody levels and if more restricted supervision has an effect on prisoner radicalization. 
Research has identified poor vetting procedures for religious leaders and correctional 
staff shortages as a contributing factor for radicalization. Close supervision and control of 
gang activity and aggressive information sharing has been mentioned in the literature as 
critical counter radicalization initiatives.   
The deradicalization/disengagement programs in Saudi Arabia and Singapore 
provide an example of “soft approaches” to fighting the radical ideology of violent 
extremist. Currently, these Middle Eastern programs are the only proactive examples of 
deradicalization efforts for the radicalized prisoner. The most obvious void in the 
literature is the absence of a counter radicalization program for America’s prison 
population. In the next chapter, we will examine the U.S. policies related to the 
confinement and management of convicted terrorist. A review of existing research related 
to the radicalization process inside correctional facilities will help identify contributing 
factors that promote radicalization inside this isolated and vulnerable society called 
prison. 
                                                 
48 Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 55. 
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CORRECTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
My years of correctional experience have provided a unique insight related to the 
cold and secluded environment called prison. As a new correctional officer, I remember 
watching the metal gates of Lake County Regional Prison slowly close. These gates, 
resembling large gothic structures shrouded with razor wire and electrical sensors, 
separated the “free world”49 from the population of inmates housed within. As the steel 
locking mechanism engaged and the metal gate slammed shut, my eight-hour shift began 
with a strong awareness of being in a new environment where trust was fictional, group 
influence was evident, and self-preservation was a goal shared by all.   
It has been 29 years since my first experience as a correctional officer. After 
serving in every security position, eight years as warden of two maximum and close 
custody facilities, and currently employed as Assistant Commissioner of Prisons for the 
Tennessee Department of Correction,  I am frequently reminded of the relief I felt in 
knowing I only had to experience the prison setting for eight hours each day. The inmates 
were not so lucky.  
I describe the correctional environment as dynamic, temperamental, and 
unforgiving. It is an environment that makes you question your identity and beliefs.50  
Good policies and procedures implemented by professional staff can reduce violence and 
enhance security. Grievances and hostile attitudes directed toward the government, which 
is charged with enforcing the rules and regulations, are common. Educational and 
treatment programs will promote rehabilitation, but I suspect nothing negates the negative 
influences of experiencing life as a prisoner. This chapter will examine the research 
related to the prison environment as well as correctional procedures and their relation to 
prison radicalization. The current U.S. philosophy for incarcerating inmates convicted of 
terrorism in the United States will also be researched.   
                                                 
49 “Free world” refers to the free society—that environment to which inmates have no access.   
50 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 14. 
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A. GROUPS AND SECURITY THREAT GROUP INFLUENCES 
In the correctional setting, it is not uncommon to witness the gravitation of like-
minded individuals as they cluster into groups.51  Within such groups, commonalities 
form and a gradual separation of the in-group52 from the general population takes place. 
In a 2008 report by Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, this type of behavior was described 
as a “self segregation” of the group from the general population.53  Within such groups of 
individuals searching for a new identity, a charismatic leader finds fertile ground to 
promote an in-group ideology. As Hanna et al., point out in the above referenced article, 
such activity should not automatically be surmised as radicalization or extremism; yet, it 
does create a vulnerable atmosphere, ripe for radicalization and deserving of special 
attention of the prison’s administration.54  Groups provide the charismatic group leader 
the perfect opportunity to promote a radical “cut and paste” translation of religious 
doctrine to a group of vulnerable inmates, anxiously seeking acceptance in an extremely 
intimidating environment.55 
Security threat groups continue to be a significant security concern inside 
correctional facilities as well as providing a model for radicalization.56  As Hamm 
reflected in a 2008 article, the radicalization process within the correctional setting often 
follows the gang model.57  Inmates join gangs for many reasons including protection, to 
promote and participate in illicit activity, or to promote a particular ideology or agenda. 
Inmates entering the correctional setting often find themselves without a support 
structure.58  In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center reported that, compared to 
                                                 
51 Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 4. 
52 “In-group” is defined as a group of individual who share a common purpose. The group defines the 
individual and the members will discredit the out group to build in-group cohesion. The in-group helps 
establish a new social identity. 
53 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 39. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 2. 
56 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 17. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 6.  
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other inmates, prison gang members were much more susceptible to radicalization.59  
Gangs or security threat groups, led by a charismatic leader, provide inmates the support 
structure and protection they desire as long as the inmate supports the agenda of the in-
group.60  Hamm’s research of the Florida and California prison system and a study of the 
Kevin James case, identified “inmate leadership as the most important factor in prisoner 
radicalization”61 
 
Figure 1.  Group’s Influence in Promoting Prison Radicalization 
Security threat groups have crossed racial lines as well as joined forces with 
traditional enemies to unite under a common goal of destroying a mutual opponent.62  In 
a special report by the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, the author makes note of traditional rival gangs such as right wing extremist 
                                                 
59 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, 31. 
60 Hamm, Prisoner Radicalizaton, 17. 
61 Ibid., 15. 
62 Ibid. 
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groups and Muslim extremist joining forces to target Israel.63  It is important to make the 
point that Islamic radicalization is not the only extremist threat within the correctional 
facility. Many right wing extremist groups that adhere to Christian Identity spread the 
radical ideology and intolerance inside America’s prisons.64 
The in-group influence inside the prison environment is a dominant force that 
deserves attention and provides a mechanism capable of fostering violent radicalization. 
Mark Hamm interviewed a veteran prison chaplain who reported the inmates’ resentment 
for the government, aggressiveness, as well as seeking a religious group nexus to support 
their hostility toward governmental authority as enhancements for prison radicalization.65  
The influence of the in-group on its members, as well as the platform the group provides 
in promoting an ideology, is conducive to radicalization. Although gangs in prison 
predominantly focus their illicit efforts toward traditional criminal activity, prison gangs 
with a social or political nexus is more susceptible to violent radicalization.66  
Correctional administrators must be aware of security threat groups and their potential 
influences on prison radicalization as well as the correctional procedures that may be 
conducive to radicalization. 
B. INADEQUATE VETTING OF PRISON CHAPLAINS/RELIGIOUS 
VOLUNTEERS 
The chaplain’s responsibilities within the prison environment are complex and 
multifaceted. Correctional chaplains have a unique insight into the ideologies and 
agendas of the various religious groups within the inmate population. Correctional 
chaplains are charged with the responsibility of monitoring and supervising religious 
activity to maintain the integrity of the religious programs.67  The American Correctional 
Association (ACA), the agency that establishes and monitors nationally recognized best 
                                                 
63 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Hamm, Prisoner Radicalizaton, 18. 
66 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, 33. 
67 Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim 
Religious Services Providers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf (accessed July 18, 2012). 
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practices and correctional standards through correctional accreditation, requires chaplains 
to “plan, direct and coordinate all aspects of the religious program, including approval 
and training of both lay and clergy volunteers from faiths represented by the inmate 
population.”68   
Providing qualified Islamic religious services that are supervised by qualified 
Islamic religious leaders or scholars is a significant challenge.69  It is extremely difficult 
to employ and locate qualified Islamic volunteers to lead the Islamic religious services 
within many of America’s correctional facilities.70  A more difficult task is determining 
what qualifies as a qualified Islamic religious leader or scholar. The Inspector General’s 
investigation into the Federal Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) selection process of Muslim 
religious services providers identified a critical issue in that there is no ecclesiastical 
body to certify Islamic providers.71  The report makes the point that in Muslim countries, 
the government certifies the legitimacy of the religion. Without an independent body to 
certify Islamic religious providers, the BOP has been encouraged to consider other 
possible methods to certify Islamic clergy such as intensive screening, interviews, and 
background checks.72  Such recommendations seem appropriate to fill the void of a 
certifying body and to provide Islamic services to the inmate population; however, the 
result of this is yet to be seen. 
Faced with the void of a trusted Islamic religious leader and the pressure to ensure 
constitutionally protected religious freedoms, some correctional chaplains and wardens 
approve the Islamic services to be led by inmates who serve as the “prison Imams.”73  In 
2004, 193 state prison wardens indicated only 50 percent of the religious services were 
supervised by staff and only half were monitored by audio or video surveillance.74  With 
                                                 
68 American Correctional Association, Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, 4th ed. 
(Alexandria, VA: American Correctional Association, 2003), 160. 
69 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38.  
70 Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’, 11. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 
74 Knox, The Problem of Gangs, 24. 
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inmates leading the service, an opportunity for a distorted version of religious doctrine 
develops and the vulnerability to religious radicalization increases.   
Inadequate vetting of prison chaplains provides an open invitation for radicalized 
clergy to promote a radicalized message to the inmate population. The United States has 
experienced the consequences of poor vetting procedures for chaplains on more than one 
occasion.   For example, the New York State correctional system failed to properly screen 
a prison chaplain supervisor who was later discovered to have exhibited ties to Al-Qaeda 
and actively engaged in anti-American extremist activity with the prisoners.75   
Warith Deen Umar, an ex-inmate and former imam in charge of recruiting and 
training chaplains for New York’s prison system as well as providing religious 
instruction himself to inmates, provides an example of how a prison chaplain can directly 
introduce radical Whabhabism and intolerance to a captive audience. Imam Umar 
declared the 9/11 hijackers as “martyrs” and identified the African American inmates 
who practice Islam as being the “natural candidates” to lead further attacks in the spirit of 
spreading justice for the American oppression of Muslims.76  Imam Umar also provided 
inmate Islamic supervision, on a part-time basis, for the Federal Bureau of Prisons.77  
After receiving questions from the Wall Street Journal, the BOP terminated Umar’s 
services and the U.S. Department of Justice Inspector General ordered an investigation 
related to the procedures for hiring Islamic clergy.78 
The United States Military charged Captain James Yee, a Muslim chaplain who 
served at Guantanamo Bay, with charges related to terrorist activity.79  In each case, a 
captive audience was exposed to radicalized messages that could have produced a 
                                                 
75 Paul M. Barrett, “Captive Audience: How a Chaplain Spread Extremism to an Inmate Flock,” Wall 
Street Journal, February 5, 2003, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1044395093714681453.html (accessed 
August 15, 2012).  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 House Committee on Homeland Security. The Threat of Muslim-American, 3. 
79 Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Terrorism: Radical 
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radicalized individual much like one of the three dozen Americans who previously 
converted to Islam while in prison and travelled to Yemen after release to train with Al-
Qaeda.80 
C. LOSS OF LIBERTY AND FAMILY CONTACT 
Prisoner personalities, employee personalities, and the conditions of confinement 
are just a few of the many elements that make up the complex prison environment but the 
restrictions on the inmate’s liberties are very dramatic. As Gresham Sykes articulated in 
his study of approximately 1,200 maximum custody inmates in the state of New Jersey, 
“We must see the prison as a society within a society.”81  In his research, Sykes reports 
the inmate’s describing their experience inside the maximum security facility as 
“depriving or frustrating in the extreme.”82  He also examined the inmate’s experience 
and labels the characteristics of imprisonment in a maximum custody setting as “the 
pains of imprisonment.”83  Moreover, Sykes identified the “loss of liberty” as being one 
of the most dramatic characteristics experienced by inmates. I would argue this loss of 
liberty and separation from support structures is relevant not only to prison radicalization 
but also to the United States current method of housing convicted terrorists.  
As reported by Hannah et al., the denial of liberty, a condition of confinement that 
is universal in prison, creates a significant void with supportive networks such as family 
and friends.84  As a prior warden of a maximum custody facility,85 I can testify to the 
positive effects related to inmates maintaining relationships with positive family support 
structures. It is my belief the support of family and friends provides motivation for 
inmates to engage in rehabilitative initiatives that contribute to a positive reentry into 
                                                 
80 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Al-Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb, 
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society. Without these positive influences to promote disengagement from the negative 
influences that motivated their criminal behavior, the inmate becomes susceptible to the 
negative influences often found in the prison setting.    
D. ABSENCE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
The prison radicalization process is a phenomenon that will require intensive 
social research to help build an understanding of the radicalization process.86  Because 
social science research considers prisoners as a protective class and the reluctance of 
correctional administrators to allow researchers access, the fundamental elements of this 
complex process called prison radicalization are difficult to identify. In a special report 
by the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI), one of 
the key findings was a lack of “social science research” and the substantial absence of 
information related to prison radicalization.87   
With 93 percent of America’s inmates serving their sentence inside a state or local 
prison,88 the intelligence sharing associated with extremist activity within our state and 
local prison systems and the federal government is critical.89  Prisons much like other 
governmental agencies are infamous for operating in silos. Until recently, the United 
States had failed to address this intelligence oversight. In December 2011, the United 
States issued the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.90  This plan tasked the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis to collaborate with the FBI and 
Federal Bureau of Prisons “to access the capacity of state correctional institutions to 
detect and share information regarding individuals who demonstrate behaviors associated 
with violent extremism while in the correctional system.”  
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In February 2003, the Correctional Intelligence Initiative was developed by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).91  
The initiative originally established a collaborative partnership between the FBI and the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to collect intelligence relevant to international terrorist 
activity within the BOP.92  Today, the initiative’s goal remains the same but also sets out 
to collect and share correctional intelligence, relevant to extremist activity or 
radicalization within the United States correctional environment.93  Federal Bureau of 
Investigation field office personnel coordinate with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) 
as well as state, local, territorial, tribal, and private corrections to collect and share 
intelligence. The coordinators in each field office provide training to correctional partners 
to enhance counter terrorism measures within the correctional systems.     
Although the plan’s concept is good, there is a significant training component 
that must be accomplished.94  Correctional officers, chaplains, and other line staff 
should receive the appropriate training to recognize radicalization or violent extremism. 
Although intelligence initiatives and training is provided at the administrative level, 
unless adequate training is provided for strategic areas, such as line staff, radicalization 
and extremism could be mistaken for general disruptive inmate activity. This opinion is 
supported by the recommendations of the Office of Inspector General documented in 
the 2004 Review of The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ selection of Muslim Religious 
Services Providers.95  Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) only recently 
implemented an in-service training component for correctional officers to help the 
officers recognize the elements and indicators of possible prison radicalization.96  
Without appropriate training, the signs and symptoms of violent extremism or prison 
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radicalization could go undetected by correctional staff. Research has identified the 
need to train staff to recognize prison radicalization.97 
 
Figure 2.  Environmental Factors Conducive to Prison Radicalization 
The prison environment is multifaceted and heavily influenced by the many 
factors. The research related to prison radicalization provides an insight into components 
that could facilitate prison radicalization. The negative effects of gangs in prison, 
inadequate vetting of chaplains and volunteers, loss of family support, and poor 
information sharing and staff training are target areas that must be addressed. The United 
States must also consider the existing strategy for housing the convicted terrorist 
currently incarcerated within our Federal Bureau of Prisons. 
E. EXISTING U.S STRATEGY FOR HOUSING/PROGRAMMING 
INCARCERATED TERRORIST IN U.S. PRISONS 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons currently houses 362 individuals convicted of 
terrorism or terrorism related violations.98  The United States government has identified 
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269 of these inmates as having international ties to terrorism.99  This number indicates a 
significant increase in international ties, which reflected only 50 inmates with 
international ties to terrorism in 2000.100  The United States has not escaped the domestic 
threat from terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Prisons currently houses 93 inmates with a 
domestic terrorism nexus. 
The current U.S. method of incarcerating terrorists can be described as restrictive, 
controlled, and not conducive to rehabilitation. Mark Hamm, in a research paper 
supported by the Indiana State University Institute of Criminology and the National 
Institute of Justice, described the U.S. model for housing inmates convicted of terrorism 
as a “Total Segregation Model.”101  Under this model, the inmates are segregated in high 
security units called “Communications Management Units” (CMU) located in Terra 
Haute, Indiana, and Marion, Illinois.102  The CMU concept was initiated in 2006 after the 
United States government discovered three terrorist, convicted of the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, sent written communication to a Spanish terrorist cell.103  Today, these 
CMUs house some of the highest profile terrorist such as Kevin James, Jose Padilla, 
Richard Reid, Terry Nichols, and Ahmed Ressam (the millennium bomber).    
These units are designed for maximum security and control and restricted inmate 
contact with other individuals. All forms of inmate communications are monitored for 
intelligence purposes with the exception of attorney/client correspondence.104  Assistant 
Director for Correctional Programs Division of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, John 
Vanyur, testified before a house subcommittee in 2007 that the BOP’s model focused on 
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the preventing recruitment and radicalization by incarcerated extremist.105  Vanyur 
testified that the BOP, in an effort to prevent inmate radicalization, has severed ties with 
most community organizations that support inmate activities and organizations within the 
prison.106  Personal contact with visitors and family visitation is extremely restrictive, 
noncontact design and continuously monitored.107   
Designed and modeled for maximum security and labeled as overly restrictive on 
Muslim inmates,108 these units have been the recipient of criticism, scrutiny, and 
litigation from inmates, American Islamic Relations groups and the American Civil 
Liberties Union.109  Some Muslim inmates, who make up the majority of the 
Communication Management Units (CMU) population, allege that their religious rights 
have been violated by the restricted environment and what they perceive as a lack of due 
process by being placed in the CMU.110  The Communication Management Units utilized 
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as well as the operational philosophy used in 
managing incarcerated U.S. terrorist, represent a dominant security based philosophy. 
The current U.S. philosophy, designed to prevent the proliferation of the radicalized 
message by implementing the segregation model, only addresses one of the symptoms of 
a much larger issue. We must also consider the unintentional consequences of continued 
segregation for inmates incarcerated for terrorism without providing an opportunity for 
treatment options that counter their violent ideologies. 
I define prison radicalization as a cognitive process whereby inmates develop a 
violent extremist mindset that legitimatizes the need and use of violence to promote a 
political or religious agenda. Within the prison setting, there are multiple variables that 
make the inmate population vulnerable to radicalization. Without an established 
deradicalization/disengagement model that provides inmates rehabilitation options to 
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counter prison radicalization, the United States will maintain a reactive posture to 
inmates returning to society who may have been exposed to radicalization during their 
period of incarceration or those who entered the correctional system indoctrinated with a 
radical ideology. As we prepare to compare other deradicalization / disengagement 
models, it is important to explain the difference between deradicalization and 
disengagement and their importance in disarming violent extremism and radicalization. 
F. DERADICALIZATION OR DISENGAGEMENT: WHAT’S THE 
DIFFERENCE? 
As we consider policy models that promote prison deradicalization, it is important 
to distinguish between two concepts:  deradicalization and disengagement. For the 
purpose of this analysis, deradicalization can be defined as a cognitive process of 
rejecting and discrediting established ideological rationalizations that support violent 
extremism and terrorism. Deradicalization therefore implies a cognitive change that takes 
place resulting in a modification of the individual’s belief system. In other words, once a 
terrorist is deradicalized, he or she no longer believes in the ideology or justification for 
using violence to promote their political or religious agenda.   
Disengagement is a process that results in an individual being separated, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, from participating, directly or indirectly, in terrorist acts. As 
Bjorgo and Horgan stated in 2009, individual disengagement should not imply 
deradicalization.111  Bjorgo and Horgan make the point that individuals may walk away 
from terrorism without shedding their core beliefs that justify their lethal actions.112  
Horgan identifies a possible key to developing effective deradicalization strategies as 
focusing on why individuals become disengaged and designing the strategy based on the 
analysis.113   
I would argue that most would consider prison a form of physical disengagement 
although it is important to remember incarceration does not prevent inmates from 
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participating in terrorist activities or support and thus does not result in physical 
disengagement. Consider the case of Kevin James and others who managed terrorist 
activity from within their cells inside some of the most secure facilities in the United 
States. Disengagement is the first step toward altering a violent mindset. Building an 
effective strategy that promotes continued disengagement and eventual deradicalization 
offers the best solution in fighting the lethal effects of violent radicalization.   
This chapter has described the prison’s setting as a multifaceted complex 
environment ripe for spreading the radicalized message. The influences of the in-groups 
as well as security threat groups cannot be ignored. These groups, under the leadership of 
a charismatic extremist, provide a powerful platform to motivate inmates seeking a new 
identity to engage in extremist activity. Without a dependable method to screen chaplains 
and religious volunteers, the prison chapel opens its doors to radical imams and clergy 
seeking a captive audience. Social science research provides the building blocks for 
possible solutions related to radicalization. Without more research within the prisons, we 
may never fully understand the negative effects of prison on the individual and as a 
result, fail in taking a proactive stance toward prison radicalization.    
The next chapter will shift the focus from the environmental factors within the 
correctional environment toward the individual treatment options for the radicalized 
inmate. In an effort to establish a recommendation for a prison deradicalization 
/disengagement model for United States correctional facilities, a comparative analysis 
methodology will be used to study Singapore’s prisoner radicalization rehabilitation 
program and approach to countering prisoner radicalization. 
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE’S PRISON 
DERADICALIZATION MODEL 
A. RATIONALE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE’S 
DERADICALIZATION MODEL 
In considering other countries that operated prison deradicalization programs, all 
of which are predominately Middle Eastern countries, Singapore was identified as the 
one country with an established program that has a minority Muslim population. Like the 
United States, the most significant threats from terrorism in Singapore have developed 
from Islamic radicalization.114  Although Singapore does not offer its citizens the same 
civil liberty protections as the United States, Singapore does have a parliamentary 
government with an established constitution and a democratic form of government. A 
comparative analysis of this country’s deradicalization program will provide the best 
comparison for U.S. consideration.   
B. SINGAPORE’S GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 
Singapore gained its independence from the Malaysian Federation on August 9, 
1965 and is considered a republic with a parliamentary system of government consisting 
of three branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial. Singapore’s constitution 
establishes a representative democracy that forms its political system and supports its 
legal system which is modeled after English Common Law.115  The executive branch of 
Singapore’s government consists of the president, the cabinet, and the Attorney 
General.116  As with many other parliamentary governments, the president serves in 
primarily a ceremonial fashion. The cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, along with 
the various ministers who are appointed from the controlling political party, are the 
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primary members that control government actions.117  The judicial branch of Singapore’s 
government consists of the Supreme Court and subordinate courts that rule with judicial 
oversight from the Supreme Court.118 
Singapore’s Minister of Home Affairs supervises the Internal Security 
Department (ISD), Singapore Prison Service, Singapore Police Force as well as other 
security related functions.119  The Internal Security Department of Singapore utilizes the 
Internal Security Act (ISA) as a valuable tool to protect the safety and security of 
Singapore’s homeland.120  ISA is an act that provides government officials with wide 
discretion to enforce preventive detention (PD) without trial of individuals suspected of 
terrorist activity. The ISA also affords the government the authority to enforce curfews, 
control an individual’s movement, and mandate other restrictive measures such as 
mandatory religious counseling, as deemed necessary by the Minister of Home Affairs to 
ensure national security.121   
C. SINGAPORE’S DEFINITION OF TERRORIST AND ACTS OF 
TERRORISM 
Singapore’s definition of “terrorist” and “acts of terrorism” can be located in one 
of Singapore’s resolutions titled “United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) 
Regulations.”122  
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‘Terrorist’ means any person who commits, or attempts to commit, any 
terrorist act; or participates in or facilitates the commission of any terrorist 
act, and includes any person referred to in the schedule. 
‘Terrorist act’ means the use or threat of action where the action involves 
serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; 
endangers a person’s life; creates a serious risk to the health or the safety 
of the public or a section of the public; involves the use of firearms or 
explosives; involves releasing into the environment or any part thereof, or 
distributing or otherwise exposing the public or any part thereof to any 
dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance; any toxic 
chemical; or any microbial or other biological agent, or toxin; is designed 
to disrupt any public computer system or the provision of services directly 
related to communications infrastructure, banking and financial services, 
public utilities, public transportation or public key infrastructure; is 
designed to disrupt the provision of essential emergency services such as 
the police, civil defence and medical services; or involves prejudice to 
public security or national defence; and where the use or threat is intended 
or reasonably regarded as intending to influence the Government or any 
other government; or intimidate the public or a section of the public.123 
D. SINGAPORE’S REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A PRISON 
DERADICALIZATION MODEL 
Since 9/11, the Internal Security Department has utilized the ISA to incarcerate124 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects and other suspected terrorist supporters.125  Since 2002, 
60 individuals have been detained by the Singaporean security forces acting under the 
authority of the Internal Security Act.126  As recently as February 2012, Singapore has 
utilized the ISA to detain suspected terrorists. Between January and February 2012, 
Sahrudin bin Mohd Sapian, Mohamed Rafee bin Abdul Rahman, and Abd Rahim bin 
Abdul Rahman, three JI members who had fled Singapore in December 2001, were 
arrested on foreign soil and returned to Singapore authorities.127  Under the auspice of 
protecting national security, the ISA allows immediate preventative detention with an 
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advisory board review by the third month of detention.128  Continued detention should 
not extend beyond two years without judicial review by an advisory board chaired by a 
Supreme Court judge and approval of the president.129  The president, as the senior 
government representative, has veto power over the advisory board and ultimate authority 
regarding the decision to enforce long-term preventative detention. The Internal Security 
Department (ISD), under the supervision of the Minister of Home Affairs (MHA), 
reviews detention and restriction orders annually to determine if the orders are still 
necessary.130 
Undetected by the government of Singapore, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a militant 
Islamist group with strong ties to al Qaeda and dedicated to establishing a caliphate in 
Southeast Asia, infiltrated Singapore in early 2001. In December 2001 and August 2002, 
the Internal Security Department (ISD) of Singapore, utilizing the Internal Security Act 
(ISA), placed 31 individuals, identified as Jemaah Islamiyah members, under detention 
for planning terrorist activity inside Singapore’s borders.131  JI members had developed 
plans for bombing foreign embassies and mass transit systems within Singapore.132  
Recognizing that Islamic radicalization had infiltrated segments of Singapore’s Muslim 
community, the government called on the Muslim community, especially the country’s 
Islamic leadership, to help develop an ideological response to counter the ill-advised 
ideological motivated extremist who plotted terrorism within the country.133  The Islamic 
Religious Council of Singapore, leaders of the Khadijah Mosque, and the president of 
PERGAS (as association of religious teachers and Islamic scholars from Singapore) were 
contacted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to evaluate the intelligence collected 
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from initial interviews of the JI detainees.134  In April 2003, the Religious Rehabilitation 
Group (RRG), a group of Islamic leaders, scholars, and teachers who volunteer their time 
and resources, was developed to assist the government in establishing a holistic approach 
in countering the misguided ideology that had invaded the country of Singapore.135   
E. SINGAPORE’S RELIGIOUS REHABILITATION GROUP (RRG) 
STRUCTURE 
The organizational structure of the RRG consists of three organizational divisions. 
The administrative oversight and leadership of the group consist of two co-chairmen. The 
co-chairmen are responsible for program implementation and nominating potential RRG 
members.136  The Resource Group of the RRG consist of a group of Islamic scholars, 
both in Islamic religion and law, that provides guidance and instruction related to the 
mission of the RRG.137  The Secretariat positions serve as coordinators of counseling 
schedules, conducts research and assist in administrative affairs among other duties. The 
largest component of the RRG is the religious counselors. This group directly engages the 
inmates, as well as the public, in strategic discourse to promote disengagement and 
deradicalization.  
1. RRG’s Counseling Program 
The cornerstone of the Religious Rehabilitation Group’s philosophy of re-
educating misguided Islamic extremist (JI members) is the RRG Counseling Program. 
The RRG counseling program, originally formed in January 2004, consists of 
28 counselors,138 four of whom are Ustazaat (female religious teachers). The RRG 
volunteer their time to provide religious rehabilitation counseling to inmates as well as 
community members. This counseling cadre is made up of a multi-faceted group of 
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Islamic scholars and educated leaders from the Islamic community. The Religious 
Rehabilitation Group (RRG) continually provides ongoing educational opportunities that 
focus on effective counseling techniques and counseling psychology that provides current 
strategy to fight the radical ideology forming the basis and rationalization of the terrorist 
mindset.139  Two religious counseling manuals have been developed to assist the 
counselors in performing their duties.   
In a June 4, 2009 article with the Straits Times, RRG Chairman, Ustaz Ali 
Mohamed indicated the latest 2009 manual, a three section, 220-page document based on 
more than 1000 detainee interviews, reflects the ongoing analysis and strategic planning 
designed to ensure current ideological counter measures are maintained and implemented 
in the deradicalization program.140  The latest manual that targets the radicalization 
process and motive of hate consists of three sections. Section one provides guidance 
related to detainees developing coping skills that help with “real-life” issues and the need 
to find a moderate approach in adjusting to modern society. The second examines often 
misunderstood concepts such as takfir (labeling someone a non-believer and the 
justification for killing the individual in the name of Islamic duty). The third section 
provides instruction for handling violent behavior and hatred that is often experienced 
after being exposed to a perverted interpretation of radical religious indoctrination.141 
The RRG’s Counseling Program focuses on four specific stages in countering the 
radical extremist mindset of the detainees.142  The first stage consists of the counselor 
interviewing the inmate to recognize radical ideologies and incorrect interpretations of 
Islamic concepts. This stage provides the counselor the insight into what is the basis or 
justification for the inmate’s actions. Next, the counselor discredits all radical and 
extremist views. This stage of counseling provides the inmate with valid justifications 
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why violent extremism must be avoided. In the third stage, incorrect interpretations of 
Islamic doctrine or radical ideologies are replaced by moderate, Islamic interpretations. 
Using his or her status as a trained religious scholar, the counselor helps establish a new 
interpretation of Islamic doctrine that contradicts the inmate’s previous violent, extremist 
mindset. The last stage of the counseling process includes an overview and emphasis on a 
moderate interpretation of the Holy Quran and how to live in a society that is filled with 
diversity and secularism.143   
2. RRG Enhancing Prisoner Deradicalization by Engaging the 
Community 
Believing you can change the mindset of the prisoner without engaging the public 
and the family members of the prisoner would be a serious misconception. The RRG and 
the government of Singapore came to a realization early in this process that correcting the 
violent, extremist mindset of the JI members accomplished only half the goal of 
protecting Singapore from terrorism. There was a minority Muslim population, many of 
which were suffering from the detention of the family’s financial supporter, and a group 
of youth particularly vulnerable to socioeconomic factors and susceptible to Islamic 
radicalization that required the attention of the RRG.144   
At the 2009 International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, the Director of 
Internal Security for Singapore discussed the government’s response to the threat of 
community radicalization.145 In a brief taken from the meeting, the director 
acknowledged the Singapore government was very concerned about the JI family 
members.146  The government feared the JI family members would take up the fight once 
their family members became incarcerated, thus creating a “second generation” of JI 
terrorists. The government and the Muslim community realized providing a degree of 
social support would serve a twofold purpose. Social assistance from the Muslim 
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community, coordinated by the Aftercare Group of the RRG,147 provided detainee family 
members a support option other than relying on the JI extremist network for assistance. 
Secondly, by assisting family members with social assistance, in the detainees are 
instilled with a sense of obligation to the Muslim community and the RRG. This will 
develop a sense of loyalty and willingness to cooperate with rehabilitation and accept the 
error of their ways.148   
The director acknowledged not everyone in the community believed the program 
would be productive. He acknowledged the fact that some terrorists would never accept a 
moderate, non-violent view of their ideology and some terrorist, even though they may 
accept and participate in rehabilitation programming, would never be released from 
custody. The director believed that by the public witnessing the seminars, social 
assistance, and community engagement carried out by the Muslim community instead of 
the government that public skepticism would be reduced, thus making the programs more 
appealing to the community.149 
3. Internal Security Department’s (Singapore Prison System) 
Collaboration with RRG  
At the 2009 International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, the Director for 
Internal Security explained the process of reviewing detainees prior to custodial 
release.150  A comprehensive review is completed regarding the inmate’s progress in the 
rehabilitation program prior to release. A review of the inmate’s initial indoctrination and 
level of involvement in the terrorist organization is a consideration. Multiple sources of 
information from “case officers, religious counselors, prison wardens, psychologists and 
research analysts” are provided to the (ISD) for consideration in determining the need for 
continued detention or restrictive orders after release.   
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After release from custody but while inmates are still under restrictive orders 
(RO) by the authority of the Internal Security Act, the ISD takes a very proactive role 
along with the RRG to ensure aftercare counseling. The aftercare group of the RRG 
serves may roles in providing social services to released inmates as well as the inmates’ 
families. Restrictive orders are usually issued to ensure continued monitoring of the ex-
inmates by their respective religious counselor, ISA officers, and support group.151  This 
governmental power that requires inmates to obtain continued counseling and 
rehabilitation after release is similar to the United States use of probation and parole 
restrictions. U.S. inmates can be released from confinement to probation or parole 
supervision and required to attend specified treatment programs such as drug and alcohol 
treatment. One major difference would be that in Singapore, detention orders (DO) and 
restriction orders (RO) can be implemented and enforced with very little due process and 
without conviction or trial.152   
F. INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT’S (PRISON SERVICES) ROLE 
IN PRISONER DERADICALIZATION 
Individuals being detained by detention orders or incarceration due to a 
conviction of a criminal offense are under the supervision of the Internal Security 
Department or more specifically the Singapore Prison Services (SPS). Singapore Prison 
Service reported in a February 1, 2012 on-line memorandum the total prison population 
on December 31, 2011 as 10,028 inmates.153  I was unable to determine how many of 
these individuals were incarcerated for terrorist-related crimes or whether any of the 
inmates were being held on detention orders. Singapore Prison Services reported that 
215 inmates are incarcerated for “Crime against Public Order”;154 however, the document 
provided no verification that inmates who were convicted or being held in detention for 
terrorism related activity were included in this category. The SPS reported a recidivism 
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rate of 26.7 percent for the release cohort of 2009, which reflected a decline from 27.3 
percent for the year ending 2008.155  The SPS defined the recidivism rate as, “the 
percentage of local inmates detained, convicted and imprisoned again for a new offence 
within two years from their release.”156    
Providing deradicalization services to inmates under detention orders and 
conviction offers another example of the collaborative effort from the RRG and the ISA. 
The attempt to reprogram the mindset of the detainees takes on a three part process 
consisting of psychological rehabilitation, religious rehabilitation, and social 
rehabilitation.157  During the psychological rehabilitation phase, psychologist routinely 
counsel with inmates in an attempt to assess the inmate’s progress in the cognitive 
process of reshaping their mindset to a non-violent ideology. One of the first changes 
experienced by the detainees and witnessed by the counselors is a reflection on the past 
actions as well as the consequences for those actions.158  The next observed change is the 
“re-evaluation of their environment when radicalized individuals realize that they have 
wrongly assumed their actions are supported by the community at large.”159  In the final 
stage of rehabilitation, the inmate realizes and recalls his path to radicalization and 
understands the misconceptions that led to his indoctrination into a radical mindset that 
promoted violence. The ISD officer who spoke at the international conference on 
terrorism rehabilitation stated, “In all these stages, there is cognitive restructuring, where 
the detainees are made to gradually learn—from psychologists—how to manage emotion 
and develop the capacity to objectively frame global events.”160 
Another stage in the rehabilitation process involves the religious counseling 
program for the detainees. The religious counseling component of the program is 
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conducted primarily by the RRG’s religious counselors.161  Acting independent of the 
government and armed with the education and legitimacy that, in most cases, is 
recognized by the detainees, the counselors begin an intensive four-step process of 
intensive dialogue to reshape and change the violent mindset of the inmate.162  This 
religious counseling phase allows for mutual debate and dialogue in an attempt to rectify 
any and all ideological misconceptions that promote violence and extremism.   
The last stage of the rehabilitation program, social rehabilitation, extends beyond 
the perimeter of the prison by offering social support and integrating the non-violent 
message of Islam into the community. The ISD work hand-in-hand with the Aftercare 
Group of the RRG to provide financial support to families in an attempt to ensure a 
smooth transition from prison to the community.163 The ISD provide opportunities for 
detainee family members to visit with detainees to help maintain the family structure thus 
providing additional emotional support for the inmate once released. By providing 
financial and social support, the ISD believe inmates can be totally focused on 
rehabilitation and cooperating with investigations.164  Vocational training is provided to 
help ensure the inmate develops a means of financial stability once released.165   
The ISD reports that not every case is a success for rehabilitation. Some JI 
members refuse to accept the Muslim community’s non-violent interpretation of Islam 
and see Muslims who believe in secularism and tolerance as infidels. These inmates who 
are non-compliant with rehabilitation take every opportunity to reiterate their position 
when meeting with counselors. In 2009, the RRG reported more than 1,200 counseling 
sessions with detainees, those under orders of restriction by the ISD, and more than 
130 sessions provided for detainee’s family members.166   
                                                 
161 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 31. 
162 “Religious Rehabilitation Group Website.” 
163 Hassan, “The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group,” 10; Report on a Conference Organized by 
the International Centre, 31.  
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid., 32. 
 40 
G. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The implementation of a deradicalization model that officially challenges an 
individual’s ideological beliefs will inevitably result in First Amendment legal 
challenges. I am not qualified to provide a legal opinion regarding the legality of such a 
model or if volunteers providing such a program would be any different than the current 
religious volunteer programs that are in place in almost every correctional facility in the 
country. Currently, the BOP trains chaplains to monitor religious services and provides 
manuals that dictate “appropriate religious service procedures and behaviors.”167  I agree 
with this procedure as there is a vested interest in ensuring any religious interpretation is 
not used to justify a violent action. Providing incentives for program participation that 
affect the inmate’s sentence structure, program assignment, or living conditions will also 
inevitably face legal challenges.  
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAUDI ARABIA’S PRISON 
DERADICALIZATION MODEL 
A. RATIONALE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAUDI ARABIA’S 
DERADICALIZATION MODEL 
Although the government structure and laws of Saudi Arabia in no way represent 
or resemble that of the United States, Saudi Arabia has initiated one of the most intensive 
counter terrorism campaigns that includes a rigorous deradicalization initiative geared 
toward Islamic radicals. Recognizing the promise of engaging detainees with counter 
dialogue that discredits and neutralizes violent rationalizations, U.S. General Douglas 
Stone, in a June 2008 briefing to the Defense Department, provided details how he 
studied the Saudi deradicalization program to develop the detainee program employed by 
Task Force 134 in Iraq.168  General Stone referenced the program’s success by providing 
impressive recidivism rates of approximately six percent for Iraqi detainee releases.169  
The Saudi program has been recognized by multiple international agencies as well as 
other governments that are dedicated to strong counter terrorism measures as being an 
effective program for countering violent Islamic radicalization.170   
B. SAUDI ARABIA’S GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
Home to the two most revered shrines known in Islam, Mecca and Medina, Saudi 
Arabia is considered the birthplace of Islam.171  Saudi Arabia has a government ruled by 
a monarchy with its capital located in Riyadh. King Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz, Saudi’s 
current king and male descendent of Abd Al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman Al Saud who 
founded Saudi Arabia in 1932, rules the kingdom. The king’s official title, “Custodian of 
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the Two Holy Mosques,” provides insight related to the dominant role of the Islamic 
religion in the government structure of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, officially referred to 
as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is composed of 13 provinces. Saudi Arabia’s 
constitution, although written as an official constitution, is literally Islamic (Sharia) law 
and the Quran.172  The executive branch consists of the king who also serves as the Prime 
Minister rules the government. The heir to the king, Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, 
serves the king as Deputy Prime Minister as of June 2012.173  Saudi Arabia’s cabinet 
members consists of a council of 22 ministers, many are relatives of the king, and 
appointed every four years.174  The ministers assist the king with the policy development 
and oversight of the different areas of governmental affairs.175 
In recognizing the relevance to radicalization as well as the factors that promote 
an individual to engage in deradicalization efforts, it is important to acknowledge the 
alliance between the al-Saud family, its allies, and the al-Sheikh family. Albeit within the 
House of Saud lies the complete establishment of Saudi rule, the establishment of 
religious legitimacy is found within the continued alliance with the al-Sheikh family, who 
are the descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab.176  Establishing and maintaining 
religious legitimacy, which is the rigorous Wahhabist interpretation of Sunni Islam, is 
essential to maintaining social control and political dominance. This ultra-conservative 
interpretation of Sunni Islam provides the framework for the Kingdom’s policies and 
provides the stage for inevitable conflict and Islamic radicalization.177 
C. SAUDI ARABIA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND ATTEMPT TO CODIFY 
TERRORISM LAWS 
The Kingdom’s legal system is based predominantly on Islamic law, although it 
has recently witnessed the introduction of secular codes and the use of committees to 
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litigate commercial issues.178  In 2002, Saudi Arabia codified a “Law of Criminal 
Procedure” (LCP) that provided a guide for legal procedure and limited individual rights. 
The LCP, consisting of 225 articles, covers issues such as rights to legal counsel and 
privacy issues, legal justifications to search and seizure as well as specific regulations 
related to timelines for detention and subsequently issuing criminal charges. It is 
important to note that although this procedure provides limited legal rights, the judicial 
and governmental enforcement officers are given broad judgment related to the 
interpretation of Sharia law and their interpretation of individual actions that meet their 
own definition of a violated crime.   
In an attempt to define and codify the criminal violation and definition of 
terrorism, the Saudi government has received criticism from civil rights groups. The new 
security law has been criticized as being indistinct and expansive. Amnesty International 
received a leaked version of the proposed law in 2011 and called into question the intent 
and legitimacy of the proposed law. Amnesty reports the anti-terrorism law would place 
harsh penalties on anyone who questions the government’s actions or criticizes the 
government’s leadership.179  The proposed law, according to Amnesty International, 
permits indefinite detainment for suspects and provides the Minister of the Interior 
massive latitude in ordering warrantless wire taps on personal phones as well as 
warrantless searches of individual’s personal property and homes.180   
The motives of this proposed law have also been called into question. Critics have 
alleged the new law as being used as a tool to “legally” crush any attempt to challenge 
the governments’ motives or express dissent.181  Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International 
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Middle East and North Africa Director, accuses the Saudi government of “adding insult 
to injury by curtailing freedoms in the name of countering terrorism.”182 
D. SAUDI ARABIA’S REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A PRISON DE-
RADICALIZATION PROGRAM 
Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam and home to the two most holy mosques for 
Muslims, has experienced its share of Islamic terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s lethal actions of 
targeting visitors to Saudi Arabia and killing them, often in public venues, can be traced 
back to 1995.183  These terrorist attacks became more prevalent and aggressive by 2003, 
including attacks on the royal regime as well as indiscriminate attacks on the population, 
including bombings within the capital city of Riyadh.184  By 2004, 22 incidents of violent 
extremism had claimed the lives of 90 civilians and produced massive numbers of injured 
Saudis.185  The Kingdom was under siege, and it was evident that Islamic terrorists, 
fueled by violent Islamic ideologies, would continue their murderous acts pending some 
type of intervention. 
With a massive wave of public repugnance for the indiscriminate terrorist acts, 
the Kingdom embarked on a creative counter terror program that would target the 
foundation of Al Qaeda’s violent ideology and extend an offer of reprieve.186  The Saudi 
government initiated an aggressive detainment campaign to remove Al Qaeda terrorist 
from the Saudi population. An initial offer of amnesty was made accessible to any 
terrorist who would surrender, renounce their ideologies and accept the state sponsored 
version of Islam.187 According to Henry, the offer of amnesty produced a cadre of 
terrorist supporters—jihadists as well as al-Qaeda leaders who had in the past avoided 
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capture but now laid down their bombs and accepted the state’s offer.188  With a large 
prison population of Islamic terrorist who indiscriminately label other Muslims as 
apostates (takfir) or unbelievers and use this as a justification to kill in the name of Islam, 
the Kingdom embarked on a program designed to target this perverted ideology by 
challenging their interpretations of the Quran.189 
E. SAUDI ARABIA’S PRISON DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM 
In response to the death and destruction at the hands of the Islamic terrorists, 
Saudi officials launched a non-publicized deradicalization effort dubbed the “Advisory 
Committee Counseling Program” in 2004.190  The program, originally designed to 
address only the needs of terrorist supporters while considering those with “blood on 
their hands” as being not appropriate for rehabilitation,191  has refocused its efforts to 
provide rehabilitative services to detainees returning from Iraq and Guantanamo.192  In 
2010, the “intensive program” reportedly conducted at nine of the 13 security prisons 
throughout Saudi Arabia had an operating budget of between 40 and 50 million 
dollars.193 
In 2008, Christopher Boucek reported the Kingdom was opening five new 
prisons, each designed for the rehabilitation and counseling of Muslim extremist.194  
These facilities built in Riyadh, Qassim, Abha, Dammam, and Jiddah were constructed to 
facilitate the design of the Saudi deradicalization program. Each prison, designed to 
house approximately 1,200 inmates, contains individual rooms that allow for the 
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segregation of radicals and the reduction of prisoner radicalization within the inmate 
population. Recognizing the possibility of an outside militant attack, the al-Ha’ir facility 
located south of Riyadh, has a refined security system to help prevent against terrorist 
attacks and intrusions. Sophisticated video technology is utilized to allow counseling 
sessions to be broadcast throughout parts of the facility and provide for direct observation 
from authorities as well as government officials who elect to monitor the activity within 
the facility. The facility is designed with multiple conference rooms to permit group 
counseling sessions and lectures as well as single rooms that allow for private session. 
Every aspect of the facility’s design is modeled toward the deradicalization efforts of the 
Kingdom. 
Oversight of the deradicalization program was placed under the supervision of the 
3
rd
 highest ranking government official in Saudi Arabia, the Minister of the Interior.195  
The program’s structure (see Figure 3) is designed around an “Advisory Committee” 
structured from four subcommittees (Religious, Psychological and Social, Security, and 
Media) each with specific responsibilities that focus on removing the violent religious 
ideologies used to rationalize terrorist activity.196 
 
Figure 3.  Saudi Arabia’s Prison Advisory Committee 
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1. Advisory Committee 
Serving as the administrative arm of the Minister of Interior for matters related to 
the Saudi deradicalization program, the Advisory Committee coordinates the activities 
and personnel that perform the various functions of the deradicalization program. Based 
in Riyadh and with committee members maintaining permanent residents throughout the 
country, the advisory committee takes great care in vetting potential counselors, clerics, 
and religious leaders who play specific roles in different area of rehabilitation.197  Careful 
attention is given to selecting individuals who have the ability to engage detainees in 
spirited dialogue and introduce the government’s opinion that, because of a 
misinterpretation of Islamic text or law, the detainee wrongfully participated in acts of 
terrorism.198   
As rumors of prisoner abuse grew within the Kingdom, the Minister of the 
Interior called on clerics, many of whom were skeptical of the governments’ intentions, 
to visit the prisons and to observe the living conditions and the efforts to rehabilitate the 
inmates being held as security risk.199  As evidence that rehabilitation was more 
important that retribution, in some instances, the government permitted high profile 
extremist to bypass incarceration and move directly into the program’s community 
treatment phase.200  These actions and by permitting the clerics to visit prisons and report 
their findings back to the communities, the program’s credibility began to establish itself 
with the community as well as the individuals who the program was targeted.   
The program is based on benevolence, not retribution, and has been referred to by 
many as a “soft approach”201 or “soft power”202 to fighting terrorism. The inmate or 
extremist is considered to have been “misled” or to have made an incorrect interpretation 
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of the religious text within the Quran. The inmate is considered a victim rather than a 
criminal. The Advisory Committee, much like the RRG in Singapore, realized to 
effectively engage the jihadists, an understanding of their mindset, religious education, 
and other social factors was necessary. According to Boucek, almost every security 
prisoner participating in the program did not have a religious education as a child.203  
According to Boucek, the committee reported most of the detainees were young, lower- 
to middle-class and members of large families consisting of seven to 15 siblings.204  
Boucek reported the committee found most of the youth “had been radicalized through 
extremist books, tapes, videos and more recently the Internet.”205  The committee’s 
report indicated that for the most part their parents were found to possess a low level of 
education and one-third of the detainees had participated in Jihad in Afghanistan, 
Somalia, or Chechnya.206  One of the most telling results from the research was the 
common theme that developed, which indicated that most of the participants had very 
little understanding of religious matters and a distorted understanding of Islam.207  These 
results somewhat correlate with the characteristics of other individuals held as security 
detainees in Iraq.208 
The Advisory Committee serves as an important role in presenting the program as 
a positive and validated program to the public as well as the inmates that the program 
serves.209  Boucek explained how, “several former militant figures” helped facilitate 
portions of the program.210  By the former militant’s participation, a sense of 
legitimization is awarded to the program by the inmates.211  It is common for members of 
the committee or representatives from the Minister of Interior’s (MOI) office to attend 
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public meetings or social events to promote the message of the program, which is 
essentially the message of the Kingdom. As with the Singapore program, promoting the 
government’s message of peace and religious rehabilitation is not exclusive to the prison 
population. The Saudi program reaches out to the inmate’s family members and the 
Muslim community at large although the major focus on rehabilitation begins with the 
Religious Subcommittee’s interaction with the individual inmate.   
2. Religious Subcommittee Framework 
The Religious Subcommittee collectively represents the largest of the four 
subcommittees that formulate the Advisory Committee Counseling Program.212  As 
reported by Christopher Boucek in 2007, the Religious Subcommittee is composed of 
approximately 150 Muslim clerics, Islamic scholars, and professors who are responsible 
for engaging the inmates in a non-intrusive manner to encourage the dialogue. Having the 
luxury of an abundance of religious scholars and clerics, Saudi Arabia has no trouble 
finding individuals to provide the counseling and religious education to the inmate 
population. It is important to mention that many of the Religious Subcommittee remains 
in contact with inmates and provides a support network once the inmate is released from 
custody.213  Some clerics choose to keep their participation in the program secret and 
shun the recognition that could be associated with the program.214  As Boucek indicates, 
these clerics express a conviction of receiving the recognition of God for their service and 
to publicize such work would only destroy their deeds. There are also those who 
participate in the program yet choose to remain surreptitious out of fear of retaliation or 
exclusion from their own groups.215  Unlike the Singapore counseling program, the 
Advisory Committee does not publically disclose the names of counselors. 
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3. Saudi Arabia’s Counseling Process   
As with the Singapore program, the counseling program is the crux of the Saudi 
prison deradicalization program. Officially referred to as “beneficiaries,”216 the inmates 
are approached in a non-authoritative manner by religious scholars and clerics who 
initiate a conversation with the inmates related to the inmate’s religious understandings 
and beliefs.217  During these initial conversations, one of the counselor’s goals is to 
ensure the inmate understands that the counselor is not an employee of the Minister of 
Interior nor does he work for the security forces but that he is a reputable cleric, 
psychologist, or trained religious scholar who is interested in helping the inmate.218  
These initial counseling sessions, each designed to last approximately two hours,219 are 
designed to build a sense of trust and hopefully ensure a more open and honest dialogue 
that will uncover the inmate’s rationale for his actions. In the initial phase of the 
counseling program, the government sponsored version of Islam is introduced along with 
references from the Quran that support the argument.220  To be considered successful in 
the program, the inmate must renounce their affiliations with terrorist groups.221  If the 
attempt to dialogue with the inmate fails or the inmate simply refuses to speak to the 
counselor, the inmate may request to speak to another counselor.   
In a 2008 Christian Science Monitor article, Khalid al-Hubayshi, an ex-
Guantanamo prisoner describes his experience with the Saudi program as a “mix of 
forgiveness, theological reeducation, psychological counseling, prison time, and cash.”222  
Hubayshi confirms the counseling sessions as being an opportunity to explain your 
beliefs and then receive an explanation that elucidates their misconceptions.223  In the 
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above referenced 2008 article, Cleric Abdel Aziz al-Hileyl, a counselor with the Saudi 
program, was quoted as saying, “Our Main goal is to open their minds and to correct their 
thoughts. We teach them to be in the middle of Islam.”224 
The second part of the counseling program consists of group study sessions that 
are designed for a six-week program. Approximately 20 detainees participate in each 
class, which is built around the concept of spirited dialogue and debate. In a Terrorism 
Monitor article, Christopher Boucek described how two clerics and a social scientist lead 
the instructions on subjects such as “takfir, walaah (loyalty), and bayat (allegiance), 
terrorism, jihad and psychological courses on self-esteem.”225  The detainees are 
schooled on avoiding misleading teachings or literature that promotes violence or 
ideological misconceptions.226  It is important to recognize the concepts taught are those 
supported and approved by the Kingdom. Although the counselors present themselves as 
independent of the government, it seems unrealistic to believe that autonomous 
instructions would be possible in the program. At the end of the program’s second phase 
an exam is provided. The “beneficiaries” are required to pass the exam prior to 
graduating to the next phase where the inmates (if eligible for release) are relocated to 
community counseling centers. 
4. Psychological and Social Subcommittee Framework/Social Support 
The Psychological and Social Subcommittee consists of more than four dozen 
psychologists, psychiatrists and social scientists.227  This subcommittee plays a dual role 
in assisting the inmates with the religious rehabilitation process. Psychologists and 
psychiatrists regularly observe counseling sessions, especially during the six-week 
program, to evaluate the inmate’s progress in the program and to make clinical 
observations regarding the mental status of the inmate. As Boucek points out, on some  
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occasions counselors may become too involved with a particular inmate’s situation to 
make an objective determination as to the inmate’s sincerity and genuine involvement in 
the program.228   
Much like Singapore’s program, the Saudi program places great emphasis on 
providing social support not only for the inmate but also his family, who may experience 
extreme hardships due to the incarceration of the family’s primary supporter.229  As 
mentioned earlier, the government understands the integrity of the program is essential 
for its success. By providing social support to family members, the government extends a 
good will gesture and helps prevent the radicalization of family members. The message 
that the extremist groups have no personal interest in the welfare of its members or the 
member’s family is a strong motivator for the inmate participants. Khalid Al Hubayshi, a 
Guantanamo inmate who returned to Saudi and successfully completed the program, 
reported receiving $800 in monthly allowances along with a Toyota Corolla and $20,000 
to pay for an upcoming marriage.230  The Saudi government encourages the inmates to 
marry as promoting a stable lifestyle and responsibility to the family structure which 
promotes disengagement.231  Many inmates who have graduated from the program praise 
the government’s effort and attribute their success to the assistance provided by the Saudi 
government and the counseling program.232   
5. Security Subcommittee Framework 
I would describe the Security Subcommittee as similar to the classification 
committee found in most United States correctional systems. The primary goal of the 
Security Subcommittee is to determine the risk associated with each prisoner and make 
recommendations regarding release and supervision.233  Although much of their work 
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remains a mystery, the Security Subcommittee members routinely communicate with 
other committee members as well as the public. This group works closely with inmates 
and provides advice on how to be successful once released. The security members inform 
the inmates of expectations and explain how the monitoring process will be utilized to 
ensure there is no contact with individuals who are considered a threat to the inmate’s 
new freedom or the security of the Kingdom.234 
6. Media Subcommittee Framework 
As the terrorist networks have found the value of utilizing an effective media 
campaign for recruitment and propagating violent extremism, the Media Subcommittee 
of the Advisory Committee has also embarked on an intensive media initiative to reduce 
radicalization and promote the Kingdom’s message of avoiding terrorist networks like al-
Qaeda. The primary target of this organized message is the most vulnerable, the young 
Saudi male.235  Recognizing its audience, the committee has created messages and 
examples that mirror the struggles of ex-terrorists who found themselves abandoned by 
the terrorist groups once they were no longer any value.236  Through research, the Media 
Subcommittee has determined the most effective method of delivering the program’s 
message is through Friday prayers (Jumu’ah prayer).237  The Media Subcommittee’s 
mission is a good example of a proactive approach to countering radicalization with a 
target group who has proven to be vulnerable to the Islamic extremist message. 
7. Detainee Family Members Role in the Program  
As with the deradicalization program in Singapore, Saudi Arabia understands the 
value of utilizing the inmate’s family as a powerful partner and motivator to promote 
positive change. Inmate family members take an active role in engaging in counseling 
sessions and encouraging the inmate’s rehabilitation effort.238  As the inmates progress 
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through the program and approach possible release, the government expects the inmate’s 
family or tribe to provide supervision and guidance to prevent the inmate from going 
astray.239   
The aftercare phase is conducted in a relaxed, non-regimented environment.240  
Inmates have access to table tennis, video games, swimming, art therapy, fresh air, and 
other recreational activities on a regular basis.241 The rehabilitation center’s therapeutic 
atmospheres is conducive to individual counseling and designed to reintegrate the 
offender back into society and restore family bonds that have been broken during the 
inmate’s incarceration.242  The family provides a powerful influence for the inmate not to 
reoffend and accepts a significant degree of responsibility for the inmate’s success upon 
release.     
Boucek makes an interesting observation by pointing out that by holding the 
family responsible, both personally and financially, for the inmate’s success once 
released, the government is utilizing the strong cultural values of honor and obligation to 
the family.243  As part of the deradicalization program, inmates receive furloughs to 
attend family functions but only if three of the inmate’s family come forward and sign for 
his release and ensure his return.244  If they do not deliver the inmate back to the 
government’s custody, they take his place.245  The significance of the social support 
element in the program cannot be overstated. Not only does it serve as a smart investment 
for the Saudi government, it serves as a significant motivator for disengagement. 
F. PROGRAM’S SUCCESS 
The Advisory Committee Counseling Program of Saudi Arabia demonstrates the 
proactive efforts of a governing body in attempting to counter the radicalization of its 
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inmate population as well as its general population. Realizing that locking individuals 
away without addressing the rehabilitation needs is like placing a Band-Aid on an 
infected wound without medication. You can expect future problems!  In January 2010, 
Marisa Proges reported approximately 4000 inmates had participated in the Saudi 
program and reintegrated back into society.246  In a 2009 BBC article, Mansour Al-Turki, 
who serves as the Director of General Affairs for the Minister of Interior and Director of 
Saudi’s rehabilitation centers, states that the Prince Muhammad Bin Naif Centre for Care 
and Advice “had to date advised and guided over 5,500 individuals returning from 
troubled areas in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries.”247   
A 2010, Country Report on Terrorism by the U.S. State Department,  states the 
Minister of Interior of Saudi Arabia reports the Saudi deradicalization program has 
served as many as 3,200 inmates who have participated in approximately 5,000 
counseling sessions.248  Doctor Abdurrahman al-Hadlaq, Director General of Ideological 
Security for the Saudi Minister of Interior, acknowledges not every case is a success. 
Hadlaq reported that during the month of June 2008, the Saudi government locked up 500 
extremists.249  The point was made by Hadlaq that if the deradicalization program had 
not been in place, the numbers may have been much higher. Dr. al-Hadlaq advises about 
10 percent of the extremists reject an offer to participate in the program.250  Hadlaq 
emphasizes the program is voluntary and that no one is forced to participate. 
In the 2010 Department of State report (referenced above), the report advises the 
Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia provided estimates of the recidivism rates to be at 
10 percent for program participants and 20 percent for participants who have returned 
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from Guantanamo.251  An article in The Long War Journal, Saudi officials are quoted as 
reporting 25 of the 120 Guantanamo inmates who had graduated the rehabilitation 
program as “returning to terrorism.”252  It is important to note these figures are reported 
by the Saudi government, and, as mentioned, they are only estimates of recidivism rates. 
Many have questioned whether a program that has only been in operation less than 10 
years can be judged as successful.253  One cannot deny the difficulty in knowing what 
actions a program graduate may be involved in once released and the issues with not 
maintaining accurate records to track individuals upon release. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
I would again acknowledge the limitations of this research. Because prisons are 
complex, fickle environments and deficient in intensive social research, it is difficult to 
determine a cause/effect relationship between the experiences of prison life and the 
negative effects, such experiences may have on the individual prisoner. In a 2009 
Criminology and Public Policy article, Useem and Clayton acknowledged the 
complexities of the correctional environment and the many “unknowns” that surround the 
issue of prison radicalization.254  Although the comparative analysis of Singapore and 
Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization programs offer externally valid data, I acknowledge the 
fundamental differences in governmental structures, cultural standards and legal 
considerations as compared to the United States. This research is dependent upon the 
self-reported data of the countries represented and independent verification to confirm or 
deny the data is not possible. Consideration must also be given to the obvious difference 
in the definitions of relevant terms from Singapore and Saudi Arabia such as 
“radicalization” or “extremism” as compared to the United States. This researcher 
acknowledges what may be considered radicalization or extremist activity in America 
could be considered normal social behavior in another country. 
B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE USED TO FORM A 
BASIS FOR THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF PRISON RADICALIZATION   
The goal of this thesis was to identify a strategy that offered possible solutions to 
counter prison radicalization within America’s correctional institutions. By identifying 
contributing factors that promote prison radicalization, proactive measures that mitigate 
these factors may reduce the prison’s vulnerability to extremism and radicalization. The 
negative influences of prison gangs and groups should not be underestimated, although 
understanding the concepts of social identity offer possible countermeasures to 
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combating the power of the charismatic group leader and their radicalized agenda. The 
following recommendations are based on my analysis of the literature and cite the 
relevant works that form the basis of the recommendations. The recommendations focus 
on reducing the vulnerability of prison radicalization by implementing policy and 
procedures that help mitigate environmental factors that research has shown promotes 
radicalization within the correctional setting: 
1. Productive Rehabilitation and Effective Security: The Dual Strategy 
The most effective correctional system incorporates productive rehabilitative 
programs with sound security policies. In reading Strategy Safari, I realized a valuable 
truth as stated in the book, “eventually situations change—environments destabilize, 
niches disappear, opportunities open up. Then all that is constructive and effective about 
an established strategy becomes a liability [emphasis added].”255  This reference from 
Strategy Safari rings true in that the dominant strategy within corrections has been a 
security focused model.  As demonstrated in this thesis, the current strategy related to the 
incarceration of convicted terrorist is predominately a security focused model. With such 
a focus, rehabilitative models may find limited support for implementation or funding.   
I would argue that in many cases, correctional policy has failed to adjust strategies 
that target the positive aspects of rehabilitative efforts. Correction’s long-term strategy 
(security), although it is the foundation of sound correctional policy, may have become a 
“liability” because we have failed to recognize the need to change and adjust the strategy 
to a model that includes both security and a robust rehabilitative initiative. According to 
the authors of Strategy Safari, “Strategy, as mental set, can blind the organization to its 
own outdatedness. Thus we conclude that strategies are to organizations what blinders are 
to horses: they keep them going in a straight line but hardly encourage peripheral 
vision.”256  Good “peripheral vision” will help us recognize the benefits of a strategy that 
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incorporates rehabilitative models with sound security policies and together offer an 
effective strategy to reducing the vulnerability for prison radicalization. 
2. Effective Monitoring and Control of Prison Groups257 
Group dynamics within American prisons should not be dismissed as insignificant 
by correctional administrators. As individual inmates enter the prison setting, an inmate 
searching for a new identity finds advantages to finding an in-group that provides 
support, security, and a possible new identity. As found in Hamm’s two-year study of 
prison radicalization, gangs in prison have a direct link to radicalization.258  Whether we 
refer to a security threat group (STG) or a group of inmates with no STG affiliation, the 
group provides a unique environment within the prison setting for a charismatic group 
leader to promote an extremist message.   
Correctional administrators should monitor and track prison groups to establish a 
proactive and informative position against any threats to the security of the facility. Gang 
intelligence officers, as well as correctional housing unit officers and correctional 
chaplains, provide an excellent resource to monitor group activity. The charismatic group 
leaders should be identified and appropriate monitoring of the inmate’s communication 
may provide actionable intelligence.    
Considering that Islam is the fastest growing religion in prison,259 Mark Hamm 
made an excellent observation in that correctional leaders may find advantages in hiring 
Muslim Americans.260  This practice has the potential of providing Islamic authority 
figures within the correctional environment to help detect and prevent Islamic 
radicalization, as well as provide a recognized Islamic staff presence inside the prison.   
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3. Rigorous Vetting and Monitoring of Prison Chaplains and Religious 
Volunteers 
Whether you consider Islamic radicalization or right wing/Christian Identity 
radicalization in prisons, both have a religious nexus that attempts to justify violence by 
attaching an individual moral or religious obligation to each member. Considering the 
religious underpinning associated with radicalization, the prison’s religious authority 
plays a vital role in monitoring and supervising the message delivered to the prison 
population. Although America’s prison policies have advanced somewhat to prevent 
radicalized prison chaplains from entering the prison’s chapel and delivering a 
radicalized message, there remain incidents where current policies are not followed and 
therefore permit radical messages to be delivered to the inmate population.261 With no 
ecclesiastical body to certify Islamic providers, prison officials should utilize properly 
vetted Islamic leaders to assist in examining the provider’s specific religious beliefs and 
interpretations of religious doctrine. As mentioned in this research, Warith Deen Umar, 
an ex-inmate and imam, was responsible for recruiting and training chaplains for New 
York’s prison system provides an example of a failed vetting process. The absence of an 
effective vetting process for prison religious service providers and volunteers enhances 
the possibility of prison radicalization. 
As part of their policy compliance inspections, prison administrators should verify 
through personal observation, video monitoring, or intermediate visits that chaplains and 
religious volunteers are following established policy that prohibits inflammatory and 
obviously disrespectful messages aimed at other religious or groups. Many of the 
recommendations found in the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) report regarding the 
review of the BOP’s selection process for Muslim religious service providers262 offer 
relevant issues that should be addressed in prison policy. 
The practice of permitting inmates to lead prison religious services, although 
convenient and at times seemingly necessary, may not be the best practice. The 
placement of inmates in a leadership or authoritative role, sanctioned by the prison 
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administration, establishes a sense of creditability that will enhance a charismatic 
inmate’s ability to promote an extremist message to the group. As discussed in this 
research, findings from a 2004 prison gang survey provided evidence that wardens 
indicated only half of the religious services in their prisons were supervised by staff.263  
If prison administrators determine it necessary to permit the practice of allowing inmates 
to lead religious services, these services should be intensively monitored in an effort to 
reduce the vulnerability for prison radicalization.   
4. Encourage Positive Inmate/Family Social Interaction and 
Communication264 
When you consider the complexity of the prison environment and the unavoidable 
restrictions that directly affect an inmate’s liberty, providing the inmate opportunities to 
maintaining positive social interactions with family or significant others is very 
important. As Gresham Sykes’s research revealed, maximum custody inmates describe 
their experience as extremely “depriving” and “frustrating.”265  Although Americans may 
argue that convicted terrorists deserve nothing more than extremely frustrating and 
deprived living conditions within prison, I would argue conditions that prevent positive 
social interactions will have a chilling effect on rehabilitation efforts and increase the 
potential for radicalization. The positive influences that seem to be fostered through 
harnessing the motivational factors found in encouraging positive family and social 
interaction can be witnessed in both the Singapore and Saudi deradicalization programs.  
5. Correctional Policy Should Encourage Social Research within Prisons 
I would argue understanding the complexities of a captive society like prison 
populations may never be truly achievable. I believe my 29-plus years of working inside 
prisons have helped me recognize how fragile this environment can be but to truly 
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understand how the prison environment affects prisoners will require social research.   It 
has been reflected throughout this thesis the reluctance of correctional administrators in 
opening the prison doors to allow researchers access to incident reports, records, and, 
most importantly, the data that can only be retrieved from the prisoners themselves 
through interviews. The report, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner 
Radicalization, identified the importance of research in truly understanding the 
radicalization process inside prisons.266  As we move forward in this battle against prison 
radicalization, correctional administrators should recognize the benefits in approving 
social research projects that potentially may provide answers to the questions that help us 
better understand prison radicalization.   
6. Provide Adequate Staff Training and Develop Intelligence Sharing 
Networks with Criminal Justice Partners 
The Correctional Intelligence Initiative, developed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), provides a 
good framework that promotes intelligence gathering, related to terrorism and prisoner 
radicalization, from United States correctional agencies.267  I argue that although the plan 
is structurally sound, there remains a significant training element that must be 
accomplished.  Correctional officers, counselors, chaplains, and other line staff must be 
properly trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of violent extremism and 
radicalization as well as understanding the procedure for reporting this activity to the 
appropriate prison personnel. The Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of 
Muslim Religious Services Providers also recognized the importance of training 
correctional staff to recognize and report signs of radicalization.268 
The Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) serves as a good example of a 
state correctional agency proactively implementing policy that mandates intelligence 
sharing and training that supports intelligence gathering. TDOC has implemented an 
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administrative policy “index # 506.27 Correctional Intelligence Initiative”269 that 
mandates the collaborative effort to share intelligence from within the department to the 
fusion center, JTTF as well as other law enforcement agencies. The TDOC training 
academy has developed a training curriculum that provides line staff the annual training 
necessary to recognize elements of prisoner radicalization and how to respond to and 
report such activity.270  Correctional administrators at the federal, state, and local levels 
should ensure collaborative strategies are in place to promote intelligence sharing as well 
as ensuring that adequate staff training has been accomplished to help line staff recognize 
prison radicalization. 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS IN 
SAUDI ARABIA AND SINGAPORE 
The existing U.S. philosophy related to countering prison radicalization and 
ideologically motivated violent extremism within the Bureau of Prisons demonstrates an 
intensive security approach focused on controlling inmate communication and the 
propagation of inmate radicalization. Throughout this research, I have failed to find any 
U.S. prison deradicalization initiative. Although the United States’ “total segregation 
model” may reduce the opportunity for incarcerated inmates with a terrorism nexus to 
preach their violent message to the inmate population, we should ask ourselves, “what are 
we doing to prepare these inmates to return to society and what effect is long-term 
maximum security housing having on the inmates”?    
I would argue that although prisons—due to their punitive nature and restricted 
environments—may be fertile ground for radicalization, they also provide unique 
opportunities for influencing this captive audience to reevaluate their violent extremist 
mindsets.   I believe the following elements of the two deradicalization models currently 
used in Singapore and Saudi Arabia offer U.S. correctional policymakers innovative 
strategies for countering prison radicalization. Through a comparative analysis of 
Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s prison deradicalization programs, this research set out to 
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provide useful data that would provide a basis for a recommendation for a U.S. prison 
deradicalization model. The following elements of each program were collectively 
examined and used as determining factors to suggest program success. These elements, 
taken collectively, will now be summarized to include recommendations for 
consideration in developing a U.S. prison deradicalization model. 
1. Program Rehabilitative Efforts (Cognitive or Educational) Used to 
Counter Violent Ideological Beliefs/Rationalizations That Support the 
Use of Violence to Promote a Political or Religious Agenda 
The crux of Singapore’s and Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization programs is the 
counseling components that challenge the radical religious ideologies that terrorist use in 
rationalizing violence to promote a religious agenda. Singapore’s RRG four-stage 
counseling program, as well as Saudi Arabia’s Advisory Committee Counseling Program, 
specifically targets what both countries have labeled a misinterpretation of Islamic 
doctrine. Both programs utilize reputable clerics, psychologists, and trained religious 
scholars to engage the inmates in focused discourse designed to stimulate a cognitive 
self-evaluation of the inmate’s radical justifications for violence.   
Another commonality found in these two programs is the gradual progression of 
the counseling encounters. Just as the initial counseling session in the Singapore model, 
Saudi Arabia initiates the first counseling session as a private conversation between the 
inmate and a counselor.271  As stated in Chapters III and IV, these initial counseling 
sessions are designed to establish a beginning point for future discourse and ideally 
provide the counselor some insight as to the specific ideological beliefs of the inmate. In 
both programs, these sessions are critical in establishing the counselor as a creditable 
religious authority. As indicated in the research, both programs utilize volunteers who 
have been vetted by the appropriate authority to deliver the program inside the 
correctional environments. As mentioned in Chapters III and IV, a heavy emphasis is 
placed on the government’s interpretation of Islamic doctrine (Quran) to discredit radical 
extremism.   
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As the counseling sessions continue, the focus of the conversation shifts toward 
explanations that discredit the inmate’s “incorrect interpretations” of religious doctrine or 
ideology. Again, in both programs, these early sessions do not involve group activity or 
conversations, although, as the counseling sessions advance, both programs incorporate 
these same justifications for discrediting violent ideological mindsets into a venue that 
includes, as mentioned in Chapter IV, up to 20 inmates. Within the group setting, both 
programs encourage spirited debate and discourse among participants. In Chapter IV, 
I made reference to Boucek’s explanation of the Advisory Committee recognizing the 
importance of utilizing “former militant figures” to help facilitate portions of these 
sessions. By incorporating a voice the inmates could relate too and recognize as “one of 
us” would hopefully help solidify the inmate’s commitment to change and add 
creditability to the programs message. 
It is also important to mention that both programs, to promote a cognitive change 
in the inmate, recognize the need for a psychological and social service presence. Boucek 
was referenced in Chapter IV as describing the use of social scientist along with religious 
clerics in the debate of subjects such as “takfir,” walaah (loyalty). The use of 
psychological courses offered inmates opportunities to reevaluate their self esteem and 
provided instruction on how to avoid misleading teachings that could result in violent 
confrontations. Chapter III provided information related to Singapore’s Internal Security 
Department (ISD) being briefed from psychologists and case officers related to an 
inmate’s progress in making a positive cognitive shift from violent extremism.272 
a. Recommendation 1: Establishment of Voluntary Cognitive-based 
Counseling Program 
My first recommendation is the establishment of a voluntary cognitive 
based counseling program for inmates who are incarcerated for terrorism related crimes 
or inmates who exhibit violent ideological expressions. 
Throughout this thesis, the point that 95 percent of the inmate population 
will be returning to our communities has been alluded to on multiple occasions. I believe 
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by focusing predominantly on the security aspects necessary for the secure incarceration 
of the 362 individuals in the U.S. for crimes related to terrorism, we overlook a unique 
opportunity to provide meaningful rehabilitation whereby inmates could possibly make a 
cognitive change in the mindset that justified violent radicalization and in some cases 
terrorism. As stated in Chapter II, Communications Management Units (CMU) have been 
referred to as a “total segregation model.”  The model, as referenced in Chapter II, 
provides little opportunity for rehabilitation.   
The counseling programs, as described in Chapters III and IV, find their 
strength and effectiveness in discourse and challenging individuals on their personal and 
religious views. This same process could possibly pay benefits in the U.S. prison system. 
Although I acknowledge the governmental pressures of Saudi Arabia that demand 
compliance with religious views are much different than in America, I remain convinced 
that by engaging inmates in discourse that challenges their rationalizations for terrorist 
activity and radicalization, we provide an opportunity for a cognitive change that will 
reduce recidivism. The reported success of both the Saudi and Singapore programs 
should not be dismissed. 
Chapters III and IV provide examples of trained psychologists, religious 
scholars, and properly vetted religious volunteers, being utilized to deliver focused 
discourse designed to provide the foundation in changing the mindset of a terrorist. I 
would argue that most state and federal correctional facilities currently have anger 
management programs that mirror some of the foundational cognitive principles that have 
been described in Chapters III and IV.   
2. Program Characteristics: Voluntary or Involuntary Participation and 
Incentives for Participation and Successful Completion 
Both the Saudi and Singapore program were reported as voluntary, although the 
incentives for successful participation may have been considered an offer only a few 
could refuse. Singapore and Saudi alike have legal authority to detain individuals 
suspected of terrorist participation. In both cases, participation in the state’s program may 
offer the only avenue to freedom. As referenced in Chapter III, Singapore utilizes the 
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Internal Security Act (ISA) that authorizes long-term detention upon approval of the 
president. Saudi Arabia, a monarchy, permits the detention by the order of the Minister of 
the Interior or the king, as described in Chapter IV. In both of these programs, some 
detainees’ only option for release may be to actively participate in the deradicalization 
programs.   
The additional incentives for successful participation in both programs are very 
lucrative and rewarding. Both programs recognize the stressors placed on family 
members, who often suffer from the incarceration of their primary financial provider. 
Realizing the need and the strategic benefit in assisting the family members of 
incarcerated inmates, monetary support is provided. In both cases, this social support fills 
a need that otherwise might have been filled by an extremist group, therefore 
compounding the radicalization issue. Secondly, the support instills a sense of loyalty and 
willingness to cooperate with rehabilitation, which are positive investments for both 
governments. Additionally, in the case of Saudi Arabia, social support, including 
financial assistance, is provided for marriages as well as transportation. Both of these 
incentives have been reported as investments in the individual’s future to provide stability 
and reduce the chances of reengaging in violent extremism or terrorist activity.273 
a. Recommendation 2: Incentives for Inmates  
My second recommendation is that inmates who participate in voluntary 
deradicalization programs should be afforded the same incentives related to sentence 
credit reductions,274 vocational/educational opportunities as well as aftercare programs 
that support their chances for successful reentry and reduce the chances of further 
extremist activity as offered to the inmates in general prison population. 
Correctional policymakers should consider participation in this program 
part of an inmate’s rehabilitative program and therefore award the same credits as would 
be appropriate for any other program or job as approved by their policy. Providing these 
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incentives, as demonstrated in this research, affords many of the similar benefits as found 
in Saudi Arabia and Singapore. As in both the Singapore and Saudi model, the inmates 
family will benefit by the inmate returning home sooner after serving a shorter sentence. 
Parole boards will have the opportunity of recognizing the inmate’s participation in the 
program as a genuine rehabilitative effort and will have the authorization to award early 
release if appropriate based on the inmate’s charge and behavior while in prison. One of 
the primary missions of any correctional system is to help the inmate correct his/her 
behavior. Providing meaningful incentives will encourage participation in a program that 
potentially could remove a terrorist threat from the homeland.   
3. Reported Success of the Programs 
As acknowledged in the limitations of research section, the research data related 
to the reported success of Religious Rehabilitation Program (RRG) of Singapore and the 
Advisory Committee Counseling Program of Saudi Arabia is totally dependent on the 
reported data from open source information as well as the reports from the two 
governments represented in this thesis.  
In a December 31, 2011 memorandum, the Singapore Prison Service reported a 
total population of 10,028 inmates.275  This researcher was unable to determine how 
many of these individuals were incarcerated for terrorist-related crimes or whether any 
were being held on orders of detention. As reported in Chapter III, the SPS reported a 
recidivism rate of 26.7 percent for the release cohort of 2009, which reflected a decline 
from 27.3 percent for the year ending 2008. In 2009, the RRG reported more than 1,200 
counseling sessions with detainees and those under orders of restriction by the ISD and 
more than 130 sessions provided for family members of detainees.  This researcher was 
unable to find additional data to reflect specific reported numbers of inmates who had 
successfully completed the deradicalization program and returned to society. 
As reported in Chapter IV, a 2009 BBC article quoted Mansour Al-Turki, who 
serves as Director of General Affairs for the Minister of Interior and Director of Saudi’s 
rehabilitation centers, as saying that the Prince Muhammad Bin Naif Centre for Care and 
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Advice had provided rehabilitative services to more than 5,500 individuals returning from 
Afghanistan, Iraq as well as other countries. Although the Saudi government 
acknowledges that not every individual will accept the voluntarily program and not all 
successfully graduate the program, it still reports recidivism rates to be approximately 
10 percent for the program participants and 20 percent for the participants who have 
completed the program after returning from Guantanamo.276  One relevant note regarding 
the Saudi program would be the reported success of the detainee program employed by 
Task Force 134 in Iraq. As mentioned in Chapter IV, U.S. General Douglas Stone 
reported in a 2008 briefing to the Department of Defense that the recidivism rates of Iraqi 
detainees released from the “134’s” program to be at approximately six percent. General 
Stone modeled the 134’s deradicalization program after the Saudi program.277 
4. Methods Used to Promote Legitimacy and Validity to the Program 
That in Theory Increases the Program’s Success 
Singapore and Saudi Arabia both recognized the need for the program material as 
well as the program facilitators to be considered legitimate in the eyes of the inmates. 
Without a recognized religious authority, no interpretation of religious doctrine or Islamic 
law would have been recognized as valid by the inmates. As referenced in Chapter IV of 
this thesis, Saudi Arabia’s government is a monarchy with an established constitution 
based on Islamic law and the Quran. By establishing the Saudi program under the 
authority of the third ranking governmental official in Saudi Arabia, the Minister of the 
Interior, the king sent a clear message regarding the legitimacy of the program. The 
government of Saudi Arabia has opened its doors to recognized Islamic clerics and 
religious leaders after rumors of prisoner abuse were detected in a proactive effort to 
promote the validity of the program and to provide proof that the program’s theme was 
rehabilitation not retribution.278   
The Saudi’s Advisory Committee provides legitimacy for the program as it serves 
as the administrative arm of the government and is made up of recognized religious 
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authority throughout the kingdom. In Chapter IV, Boucek described how the Saudi 
program utilized “several former militant figures” to help facilitate the program. Again, 
this technique provides significant legitimacy to the program’s claim that the inmates 
have based their violent actions on a misinterpretation of Islamic law. To witness a 
former terrorist validate this claim provides a strong validation. 
Singapore also established validity by creating an administrative element of the 
RRG that authenticates volunteer credentials as well as material used in the counseling 
sessions.279  Religious scholars, both in Islamic law and religion, provide support to the 
Singapore program. The RRG program provided updated training manuals to counselors 
that ensure modern information is utilized during the counseling programs. As with the 
Saudi program, the RRG group promotes an intensive aftercare phase that assist detainee 
family members with financial and social support needs during the inmate’s 
incarceration. As reported in Chapters III and IV, such actions not only reduce the 
vulnerability of radicalization with inmate’s family members, but they also provides a 
powerful motivator for the inmates to see the government’s program as legitimate in 
focusing on rehabilitation and not retribution.   
a. Recommendation 3: Invest in Volunteers, Chaplains, and 
Psychological Professionals and Partner with Family Members 
My third recommendation had two parts. First, I recommend that U.S. 
Corrections should invest in an intensive effort to recruit properly vetted and trained 
volunteers, chaplains, and psychological professionals that would be utilized in an 
established counseling program as recommended in recommendation 1. 
The second part of the recommendation is to partner with inmate family 
members to promote a positive social relationship that can be utilized as a motivating 
factor to encourage productive inmate participation in the counseling program. 
As referenced in Chapters III and IV, both deradicalization programs 
utilized religious volunteers, recognized religious scholars, and mental health 
professionals to ensure the quality and legitimacy of the deradicalization programs were 
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maintained. Both programs also provided valid subject matter experts that engaged the 
inmates in intensive discourse that challenged a particular extremist religious based 
ideology. I would argue that most correctional departments have a limited supply of 
religious volunteers and finding qualified Islamic scholars who have been properly vetted 
will be a challenge.280   
Throughout the research, the point was made that only qualified Islamic 
scholars or clerics, with the appropriate credentials, could provide the recognized 
legitimacy needed to make the program successful. To meet this challenge, a 
modification in U.S. strategy may be required by turning to advances in technology that 
would allow videoconferencing with recognized clerics or religious scholars in other 
regions or even other countries. To ensure the validity of the counseling program, 
developing a cadre of qualified volunteers and mental health professionals will be a 
critical component to success. It is important to note that a “one size fits all” strategy will 
not meet the demands of a prison deradicalization program. Correctional administrators 
will need to adjust the resources to meet the program requirements depending on the 
ideology targeted. 
By utilizing the family members of inmates as partners to promote 
positive social relationships for the inmates and to encourage inmate participation in the 
rehabilitation program, the positive influences mentioned in section B. 4 (p. 61) of this 
chapter, as well as Chapters IV and V, will be recognized. My experience as a 
correctional administrator has demonstrated a positive correlation between inmates 
maintaining family bonds and their positive adjustments to the correctional setting as well 
as their willingness to actively engage in rehabilitation. As demonstrated in Chapter IV, 
family members play a vital role in the success of the deradicalization program.281  The 
family participation may also promote a sense of obligation for the inmate to avoid any 
situation that could result in reoffending.   
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5. Methods of Aftercare or Post-Release Supervision 
The aftercare initiatives and post-release supervision in Singapore and Saudi 
Arabia are very generous and serve as an extension of the supervision arm of the 
government once the inmate returns to society. The RRG’s aftercare group provides 
aftercare and social assistance to inmates directly by providing post incarceration 
counseling.282  As inmates leave the confines of prison, the government of Singapore 
utilizes detention orders, as described in Chapter III, that require continued counseling 
and community supervision.283  The RRG recognized the pressures inmates would face 
once leaving the confines of the correctional setting and returning home. Providing this 
continued counseling helps not only to continue a support structure for the inmate after 
leaving prison, it also allows monitoring of the inmate to track his behavior and 
compliance with avoiding extremist activity.   
Indirectly, the aftercare group supports the inmates while still incarcerated by 
providing social support to inmate family members. The support is found in monetary 
benefits, as well as providing social programs that help family members adjust to the 
incarceration of their loved one.284  By providing this support, the RRG and the Muslim 
community attempt to prevent the extremist from stepping in to offer assistance to the 
inmate’s family and regaining a foothold that could result in reoffending or radicalization 
of family members.285 
Realizing you cannot force rehabilitation and considering the constitutional rights 
that protect religion, participation in the program would be voluntary. Both programs 
researched in this thesis have been reported as voluntary programs. The integrity of any 
counseling program that sought a cognitive change in the individual would be dependent 
on the voluntary nature of the program. This issue was addressed in recommending a 
totally voluntary program.   
                                                 





Saudi Arabia’s Psychological and Social Subcommittees play an important role in 
providing aftercare and social support to the program participants. As with the RRG, the 
Saudi program recognizes that the inmate’s success upon release from incarceration is 
dependent on reentry rehabilitation and intensive aftercare and monitoring. Inmates who 
have completed the program report that they have received up to $800 in monthly 
allowances along with a new car and thousands of dollars to pay for a marriage.286  The 
Security Subcommittee provides a method of enforcement monitoring after the inmate is 
released,287 much like parole supervision in America. This type of monitoring helps to 
ensure compliance with post release mandates that were established prior to release.   
The last phase of Saudi Arabia’s program takes place in a rehabilitation center 
that allows for family bonding and adjusting to a new lifestyle without extremist 
involvement.288  Set in a therapeutic atmosphere, a time of reflection, counseling, and 
family bonding take center stage. As mentioned in Chapter IV, while in the center, 
inmates are granted furloughs that help reestablish family ties. As family ties are 
reestablished, the government makes it clear the responsibility for the inmate’s success 
after returning home is a dual responsibility shared by the inmate as well as the family.289 
a. Recommendation 4: Develop and Implement a Vigorous 
Aftercare Initiative  
My fourth recommendation is to develop and implement a vigorous 
aftercare initiative that ensures post-incarceration monitoring/supervision, counseling and 
social service assistance upon successful completion of the deradicalization program. 
As with Singapore and Saudi Arabia, an aggressive aftercare initiative for 
inmates who complete a deradicalization program would extend the rehabilitation 
components from the prison program into our communities once the inmates are released 
from incarceration. Although providing financial support, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
                                                 
286 Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash.” 10. 
287 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 219. 
288 Mohammad, “To Deprogram a Jihadist, 30.”  
289 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy. 23. 
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would not be feasible in America, the U.S. should consider a partnership with properly 
vetted volunteer groups that could assist with job placement and social support. Providing 
these inmates the opportunity to enhance their ability to function and support their family 
with meaningful employment upon their release is vital to their successful reintegration 
into society and reduces their vulnerability to radicalization. As explored in Chapters III 
and IV, this community network of volunteers could serve as an extension of the 
volunteer groups that assist with the counseling program inside the prison. Much like the 
Singapore and Saudi model, the aftercare program would be an extension of the 
rehabilitative effort that takes place inside the prison. 
The Singapore and Saudi programs both detail how an aftercare program 
provided the government a method for monitoring the inmate once they left the 
correctional setting. As Michael Brown identified in his Naval Postgraduate School 
thesis, inmates who leave prison soon vanish into the communities and social fabric of 
America.290  The challenge of tracking radicalized inmates once they leave custody has 
proven to be almost impossible. By judicial orders or probation/parole supervision, 
inmates could be required to continue cognitive behavior modification programs such as 
counseling or pro-social life skills as a condition of their release. I realize this concept 
may face legal challenges, but it would provide a dual service by providing a level of 
monitoring once the inmate is released from custody as well as assisting the inmate with 
behavior management issues. It is not uncommon for many state correctional systems 
today to mandate that inmates on parole participate in programs such as drug and alcohol 
treatment or anger management programs.   
Post-incarceration monitoring of inmates who serve 100 percent of their 
sentence would create a significant challenge without legal authority to authorize the 
action and require the inmate’s compliance. A strategy to assist in providing some degree 
of monitoring inmates without judicial order would be to collaborate with family 
members as partners in the aftercare of the inmate. As discussed in Chapters III and IV, 
both Singapore and Saudi Arabia partner with the inmate’s family not only to provide the 
                                                 
290 Brown, “Freed.” 55. 
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family support but also to encourage the family to hold the inmate accountable for not 
participating in actions that could lead to reoffending.   
The recommendations in this chapter target the environmental and policy 
issues that potentially increase the vulnerability of radicalization within the prison 
environment as well as the individual rehabilitative needs of a radicalized inmate. These 
recommendations provide a framework to develop a proactive deradicalization model for 
U.S. prisons. Specific elements of Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization 
initiatives that incorporate community volunteers, religious scholars and clerics, inmate’s 
family members as well as prison staff provide new possibilities for consideration in 
developing a United States prison deradicalization program. This researcher 
acknowledges a “one size fits all” approach would be ineffective; yet, these 
recommendations provide systematic solutions that can be modified to meet the specific 
issues germane to the radicalization. 
The current United States model of segregating terrorist in communication 
management units may offer a false sense of security and provides limited opportunity to 
change the mindset of a radicalized prisoner. The effects of segregation on the individual 
should be considered as they relate to the possibility of further radicalization and very 
limited opportunity for rehabilitation. The recommendations in this thesis offer multiple 
rehabilitative opportunities such as social, psychological and vocational rehabilitation. 
They also provide possible solutions to reduce the negative effects of the prison 
environment that may lead to a higher level of vulnerability for prison radicalization. 
Taken collectively, all increase the inmate’s chances of successful reintegration into 
society as well as enhance the security of the United States homeland. 
The Appendix contains recommendations for a viable U.S. prison 
deradicalization model.  
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APPENDIX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A U.S. PRISON 
DERADICALIZATION MODEL 
                                                 
291 Sentence credit reductions would be considered the reduction of days from the offender’s total 
sentence for satisfactorily participating in a program or job as well as the reduction of days from the 
sentence for good behavior.  
Recommendations for a U.S. Prison Deradicalization Model 
Suggested Proactive Measures for the 
Correctional Environment Aimed at 
Reducing the Vulnerability of Prison 
Radicalization 
Suggested Proactive Measures That Provide 
Individual Treatment Options for the 
Radicalized Inmate 
1. Productive Rehabilitation and Effective 
Security: The Dual Strategy (effective 
rehabilitation enhances security) 
1. The establishment of a voluntary cognitive 
based counseling program for inmates who 
are incarcerated for terrorism related crimes 
or inmates who exhibit violent ideological 
expressions. 
2. Effective Monitoring and Control of 
Prison Groups 
2. Inmates who participate in voluntary 
deradicalization programs should be 
afforded the same incentives related to 
sentence credit reductions,291 
vocational/educational opportunities as well 
as aftercare programs that support their 
chances for successful reentry and reduce 
the chances of further extremist activity. 
3. Rigorous Vetting and Monitoring of 
Prison Chaplains and Religious 
Volunteers 
3. U.S. Corrections should invest in an 
intensive effort to recruit properly vetted and 
trained volunteers, chaplains, and 
psychological professionals that would be 
utilized in an established counseling 
program as recommended in 
recommendation 1. 
4. Encourage Positive Inmate / Family 
Social Interaction and Communication 
4. Develop and implement a vigorous aftercare 
initiative that ensures post incarceration 
monitoring/supervision, counseling and 
social service assistance upon successful 
completion of the deradicalization program. 
5. Correctional Policy Should Encourage 
Social Research within Prisons 
6 Provide Adequate Staff Training and 
Develop Intelligence Sharing Networks 
with Criminal Justice Partners 
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